摘要
作为长期以来全社会密切关注的热门话题,食品安全不仅对人们的生活尤为重要,更与全社会的稳定有着千丝万缕的联系。为了研究动态惩罚机制对食品安全生产的影响,构建了基于系统动力学的食品安全生产监管博弈模型,分别在一般情形与动态惩罚机制下研究了食品企业与政府之间的演化过程。结果表明,在一般情形下,博弈双方之间的策略在中心点处是不稳定的,双方的策略随时间变化呈现周期振荡的状态,具有很强的不确定性。引入动态惩罚机制后,双方的策略会收敛到稳定的焦点。研究表明,动态惩罚机制会大大提高食品企业重视安全生产的积极性,因此政府部门增大对食品企业违规生产的惩罚力度、设定动态惩罚机制将是食品安全问题得以解决的重要举措。
This paper constructs a game model of food enterprise safety production supervision based on a system dynamics model.To analyze the evolution between the government and food enterprises so as to supervise the illegal food enterprises,we build an evolutionary game model to analyze the evolution of the two agents and combine the evolutionary game with the system dynamics model.Then,we set different parameters under four different situations and use the system dynamics model to simulate the results in these four cases.Firstly,we study the evolution process between food enterprise and government under a general situation.Secondly,we study the evolution process between food enterprises and the government under a dynamic punishment mechanism.Then,we compare the two models to illustrate the efficiency of the dynamic punishment mechanism.The results show that,in general situation,the strategy between the two sides of the game is unstable at the central point.That is to say,the government and the enterprise can not reach a stable status in the game,they don’t have certain strategies to conduct.Moreover,the strategy of both sides changes with time in a state of periodic oscillation,and the trace of the game turns out uncertain.However,when we add the dynamic punishment mechanism to the model,the strategies of the government and the enterprise tend to converge.Besides,with the change of time,the probability of food enterprises choosing"pay attention"and the government choosing"active supervision"converge to different values respectively.It means that the dynamic punishment mechanism can greatly improve the enthusiasm of food enterprises to pay attention to food safety production.Therefore,if the government departments increase the punishment of food enterprises against production violations and set a dynamic punishment mechanism,it will be an important measure to solve food safety problems.
作者
罗宏森
王传生
石夫磊
LUO Hong-sen;WANG Chuan-sheng;SHI Fu-lei(School of Management and Engineering,Capital University of Economics and Business,Beijing 100070,China;Public Security and Emergency Research Institute,Sichuan Normal University,Chengdu 610101,China)
出处
《安全与环境学报》
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2022年第5期2660-2667,共8页
Journal of Safety and Environment
基金
中国地震局重点课题(DZJGFS2021013)
四川省哲学社会科学重点研究基地项目(QGXH21-12)
四川应急管理知识普及基地重点项目(SCYJ2021-02)
首都经济贸易大学北京市属高校基本科研业务费专项(XRZ2022029)。
关键词
安全社会工程
食品安全
演化博弈
系统动力学
动态惩罚机制
safety social engineering
food safety
evolutionary game
system dynamics
dynamic penalty mechanism
