摘要
以中国内地2003年爆发的SARS危机为背景,运用演化博弈理论,对信息交流在公共卫生突发事件处理中的作用进行分析。模型中政府部门通过采取强制干预措施后,改变了演化博弈中的要素博弈收益矩阵,从而使得博弈均衡发生演化,导出有限期终止的、经历扩散和收敛两个发展阶段的动态方程;这将不同策略学习障碍加以内生化,使其成为信息公开程度的函数,对政府部门信息公开措施在公共卫生突发事件不同阶段中的作用进行了分析。最后,结合中国2003年SARS疫情统计数据对理论模型进行实证分析。结果表明,政府部门采取信息公开措施后,有利于抑制公共卫生突发事件的扩散趋势,加快其收敛速度。
This paper analyses communication in the measure of mass unexpected incident used evolutionary game theory. It educes the diffused function that mass unexpected incident is in the system crisis phase and transforming phase used the (generalized) replicator dynamics model. It analyses the effect of the government who takes opening communication measure in the (different) phases, through strategy-specific barriers to learning endogenetic disposes the function of the opening (communication) degree. At last, the paper makes the econometric analysis based on the SARS data in China 2003year. It (draws) the conclusion that government needs control the opening communication degree in the system crisis phase and duly (open) communication in order to lead different social estates to engender the new cognizing equilibrium in the system (transforming) phase.
出处
《系统工程》
CSCD
北大核心
2005年第1期21-27,共7页
Systems Engineering
基金
国家自然科学基金优秀创新群体资助项目(70121001)
国家自然科学基金资助项目(10371094)
