摘要
地方政府应急预防协同失灵何以生成?文章在该领域相关研究成果的基础上,运用基于SOR理论建立的组织分析框架,通过对X区“城镇燃气整治专项行动”的案例研究发现:多重环境因素复合而生的“负重”与“问责”压力,使“选择性纾压”的个体行为与“竞争性避责”的群体行动相继产生,进而引发地方政府应急预防协同失灵的生成。“风险感知”与“行动共识”同向开启的“机会之窗”,“角色—监督—测量”联合失序形成的“机会空间”,为地方政府应急预防协同失灵的生成创造可能并提供条件,两者的耦合是触发地方政府应急预防协同失灵的直接开关。文章构建的生成模型力图为理解中国情境下地方政府跨部门合作行动中协同失灵的生成机理提供新视角。
How does the collaboration in local government emergency prevention fail?Based on the existed research in related fields and through the analysis of the case of urban gas regulation special action with the framework provided by SOR theory,this paper found that the pressure of“workload”and“accountability”caused by multiple environmental factors resulted in the individual behavior of“selective relief”and the group action of“competitive avoidance of responsibility”,which further led to the failed collaboration in local government emergency prevention.The“window of opportunity”opened by“risk perception”and“action consensus”in the same direction,and the“opportunity space”formed by the joint disorder of“role-supervision-measurement”create the possibility and provide conditions for the failed collaboration in local government emergency prevention.The coupling of the two is the direct switch that triggers the failed collaboration in local government emergency prevention.The model constructed in this paper tries to provide a new perspective for understanding the generative mechanism of collaborative failure in the inter-departmental cooperative actions of local governments in the context of China.
作者
丁煌
张绍飞
Ding Huang;Zhang Shao-fei
出处
《理论与改革》
CSSCI
北大核心
2022年第6期106-118,160,共14页
Theory and Reform
基金
国家自科基金面上项目“地方政府公共政策执行行为选择机制的演化博弈分析”(72174155)
国家社科基金重点项目“提高政策效能与地方政府公共政策执行力研究”(11AZZ004)。
关键词
SOR理论
地方政府
应急预防
协同失灵
案例研究
SOR theory
Local Government
Emergency Prevention
Failed Collaboration
Case Study
