摘要
近年来,随着社会经济的快速发展,控股股东股权质押已经成为我国资本市场上一种非常常见的现象。所谓的控股股东股权质押,是指控股股东将自身所持有的股份作为质押标的物,抵押给银行、证券公司、信托公司等金融机构后获得信贷资金的一种债务融资方式。这种融资方式在便利性、快捷性方面比其他融资方式更具优势,能够快速地帮助控股股东解决资金短缺的问题,但也使得企业面临着控制权转移风险。正因如此,上市公司控股股东股股权质押行为引起了学术界与实务界的普遍关注。虽然,现有研究探讨了控股股东股权质押对企业审计费用的影响,但鲜有学者深入家族企业层面来探讨两者之间的关系。为此,文章以2008—2017年我国A股上市家族企业作为研究对象,深入考察了控股股东股权质押对审计费用的影响,并分析了CEO不同来源产生的调节效应。在此基础上,我们进行了研究设计,并构建了相关的研究模型,通过描述性统计分析、相关性分析、多元回归分析和机制分析验证了文章提出的相关机制及假设。研究发现,家族控股股东股权质押与审计师收取的审计费用显著正相关;同时,与家族CEO相比,非家族CEO会明显地削弱家族控股股东股权质押与审计费用之间的正相关关系。进一步分析发现,控股股东进行股权质押后会导致公司治理风险与盈余操纵风险显著增加,从而提高了家族企业的审计费用。最后,考虑潜在的内生性问题,重新度量审计费用,并缩小家族企业样本范围后,我们的研究结论依然保持不变。以上研究结论表明,家族企业控股股东进行股权质押所产生的风险能够被审计师识别,因而审计师会通过收取更多的审计费用来予以补偿;同时,非家族CEO能够制约家族控股股东的利益侵占行为,将有助于审计师更好地识别家族控股股东股权质押所产生的�
In recent years, with the rapid development of society and economy, controlling shareholder’s share pledge has become a very common phenomenon in China capital market. The so-called share pledge of controlling shareholders refers to a debt financing method in which controlling shareholders pledge their own shares to banks, securities companies, trust companies and other financial institutions to obtain credit funds. This financing method has more advantages than other financing methods in terms of convenience and rapidity, which can quickly help controlling shareholders solve the problem of capital shortage, but also makes enterprises face the risk of control transfer. For this reason, the share pledge behavior of controlling shareholders of listed companies has aroused widespread concern in the academic and practical circles. Although existing research has explored the influence of controlling shareholder’s share pledge on corporate audit fees, few scholars have gone deep into the family firms level to explore the relationship between controlling shareholder’s share pledge and audit fees. To this end, this article takes China’s A-share listed family companies from 2008 to 2017 as the research object, deeply examines the impact of controlling shareholder’s share pledge on audit fees, and analyzes the moderating effects of CEO from different sources. On this basis, we have carried out research design, constructed relevant research models, and verified the relevant mechanisms and hypotheses proposed in the article through descriptive statistical analysis, correlation analysis, multiple regression analysis and mechanism analysis. The study finds that the share pledge of family controlling shareholders is significantly positively correlated with the audit fees charged by auditors. At the same time, compared with family CEO, non-family CEO will significantly weaken the positive correlation between the family controlling shareholder’s share pledge and audit fees. Further analysis finds that the controlling
作者
苏春
刘星
SU Chun;LIU Xing(School of Accounting,Chongqing University of Technology,Chongqing 400054,P.R.China;School of Economics and Business Administration,Chongqing University,Chongqing 400044,P.R.China)
出处
《重庆大学学报（社会科学版）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2022年第5期73-91,共19页
Journal of Chongqing University(Social Science Edition)
基金
国家自然科学基金青年项目“利率市场化,监管套利与资源配置——银行理财产品发行及购买的影响因素和经济后果研究”(71802029)
教育部人文社会科学研究一般项目“国家审计、党组织建设与国有企业防范违规行为研究”(19XJC790006)
重庆理工大学科研启动基金项目“家族董事席位超额控制、投资决策与企业价值”(2021ZDR023)。
关键词
家族企业
控股股东股权质押
CEO来源
审计费用
family firms
controlling shareholder’s share pledge
source of CEO
audit fees
