摘要
目的为营造良好的社会风气,杜绝收受回扣现象的发生,规范医疗设备购销秩序,优化公立医院医疗设备招标采购监管机制。方法基于演化博弈理论,对医疗设备招标采购阶段利益相关者进行识别,构建演化博弈模型,通过模型求解得到各方主体的行为选择演化稳定策略,并运用Matlab仿真模拟,探讨影响参与主体行为的因素。结果根据模型分析可知,当合谋的额外收益小于合谋被查处所受处罚及合谋成本之和、监管机构严格监管的成本较小时,能实现良好的均衡状态。结论通过模型仿真分析发现,监管机构只加强一方的监管力度并不能实现监管目标,加强对合谋体的监管与处罚可预防腐败合谋的发生,同时审计机关对监管机构过高的问责力度不利于双方策略行为向理想的平衡状态转化。
Objective To create a good social atmosphere,put an end to the phenomenon of accepting kickbacks,standardize the process of medical equipment market,optimize the supervision mechanism of public hospital medical equipment bidding and purchase.Methods Based on evolutionary game theory,stakeholders in the stage of medical equipment bidding and procurement were identified,an evolutionary game model was constructed.The evolutionary strategy of behavior selection of all parties was obtained by solving the model,and the influence on the behavior of participants was discussed by using Matlab simulation.Results According to the model analysis,a good equilibrium state could be achieved when the extra income of collusion was less than the sum of the punishment and cost of collusion investigated and punished,and the cost of strict supervision by regulators was small.Conclusion Through the model simulation analysis,it is found that only strengthening the supervision of one party can not achieve the supervision goal,strengthening the supervision and punishment of the conspirators can prevent the occurrence of corruption collusion,and the audit institutions’excessive accountability for the supervision machine is not conducive to the transformation of the strategic behavior of both parties to the ideal balance state.
作者
寇金萌
洪学智
卿妤婕
丁雨薇
郭易
杨名赫
张丽丽
KOU Jinmeng;HONG Xuezhi;QING Yujie;DING Yuwei;GUO Yi;YANG Minghe;ZHANG Lili(School of Management,Beijing University of Chinese Medicine,Beijing 102488,China)
出处
《中国医疗设备》
2022年第9期118-122,共5页
China Medical Devices
关键词
医疗设备
招标采购
演化博弈
仿真模拟
medical equipment
bidding procurement
evolutionary games
simulation
