摘要
考虑由单一制造商、单一零售商及两个独立市场(高端市场和低端市场)组成的供应链系统,针对零售商可能窜货的问题,建立了制造商RFID采纳和零售商窜货的动态博弈模型,分析了零售商窜货策略和制造商RFID采纳策略,研究了RFID双重效应(成本效应和惩罚效应)对灰色市场、企业收益及社会福利的影响。研究表明:(1)RFID可以有效抑制零售商的窜货行为。当不存在RFID时,若市场差异较大,零售商窜货,若市场差异较小,零售商不窜货。而当存在RFID时,即使市场差异足够大,若RFID惩罚效应较强,零售商不窜货;(2)RFID可能使得零售商窜货反而会增加制造商的收益。当不存在RFID时,零售商窜货总是降低制造商的收益。而当存在RFID时,若市场差异较小且RFID成本效应较强,零售商窜货增加了制造商的收益;(3)制造商并非总是采纳RFID,其策略取决于市场差异的大小和RFID双重效应的强弱。
A dynamic game between a manufacturer and a retailer is investigated in this paper. A supply chain with two separate markets is considered, namely, high-end market H and low-end market L. The manufacturer sells product directly to high-end market H, but indirectly to low-end market L through the retailer. Gray market emerges when a product is parallel imported from low-end market to high-end market by the retailer. In addition to the pricing decisions, the manufacturer decides whether and under what conditions to adopt RFID, and the retailer determines whether to parallel import. Through solving a dynamic game model, several findings are revealed. First, RFID can effectively combat retailer’s parallel importation. In the absence of RFID, retailer’s parallel importation always decreases manufacturer’s profits. However, in the presence of RFID, it not only reduces the negative of parallel importation on manufacturer, but also makes manufacturer benefit from parallel importation under some conditions. Second, although RFID can deter retailer’s parallel importation, the manufacturer does not always adopt it. When the market disparity between high-end market and low-end market is sufficient small, the manufacturer does not adopt RFID. When the market disparity is moderate, the manufacturer adopts RFID if the RFID penalty effect is relatively strong or RFID penalty effect is relatively weak and RFID cost effect is moderate. When the market disparity is sufficient large, the manufacturer adopts RFID if the RFID penalty cost is high or RFID unit cost is high or both. Finally, it is explored that the impacts of RFID and parallel importation have two sides. Parallel importation increases social welfare in the case of without adopting RFID. While in the case of with adopting RFID, parallel importation increases social welfare only under certain conditions, which implies that parallel importation may be harmful to social welfare once the manufacturer adopts RFID.
作者
丁龙
胡斌
常珊
DING Long;HU Bin;CHANG Shan(School of Management Science and Engineering,Nanjing University of Information Science and Technology,Nanjing 210044,China;School of Management,Huazhong University of Science and Technology,Wuhan 430074,China;School of Information Management and Statistics,Hubei University of Economics,Wuhan 430074,China)
出处
《中国管理科学》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2022年第8期82-94,共13页
Chinese Journal of Management Science
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71971093,72001116,72001115)
教育部人文社会科学研究资助项目(20YJC630041)
湖北省教育厅科学研究计划项目(B2021169)。
关键词
射频识别
窜货
灰色市场
供应链管理
博弈论
RFID
parallel import
gray market
supply chain management
game theory
