摘要
基于公平偏好视角,引入委托代理模型研究公立医院高层管理者与医生的委托代理关系及激励机制,进一步分析公平偏好对医生努力程度、激励程度的影响。研究结论表明:在公平偏好心理下,其公平偏好程度与努力程度呈负相关,还与激励系数呈正相关,由此会产生道德风险问题。此外,医生的努力程度与努力成本系数负相关,与激励强度正相关;医生的激励系数还与努力成本系数负相关,与风险规避系数负相关,与管理者对医生行为的可监督性负相关。
Based on the perspective of fairness preference,a principal-agent model is introduced to study the principal-agent relationship and incentive mechanism between senior managers and doctors in public hospitals,and further analyzes the impact of fairness preference on doctors efforts and motivation.The results show that the degree of fairness preference is negatively related to the degree of effort,and is also positively related to the incentive coefficient,which will lead to the problem of moral hazard under the fairness preference psychology.In addition,the doctor s effort level is negatively correlated with the effort cost coefficient,and positively correlated with the incentive intensity;the doctor s motivation coefficient is also negatively correlated with the effort cost coefficient,negatively correlated with the risk aversion coefficient,and negatively correlated with the supervisor s ability to monitor the doctor s behavior.
作者
周桐如
王俏荔
ZHOU Tong-ru;WANG Qiao-li(School of Public Health and Management,Ningxia Medical University,Ningxia 750000,China)
出处
《卫生软科学》
2022年第9期22-26,共5页
Soft Science of Health
基金
国家自然科学基金项目-基于多任务委托代理理论的公立医院医生行为激励约束机制研究(71964028)。
关键词
公平偏好
委托代理
激励机制
fairness preference
principal-agent
incentive mechanism
