摘要
打破“经济自利人”假定,将代理人公平偏好心理因素引入科技保险风险补偿合同。在委托-代理分析框架下,研究公平偏好倾向和风险厌恶对风险补偿合同设计的影响。研究结论表明,边际补偿系数随着保险公司公平偏好强度及委托人的风险厌恶系数的增加而递增,但随着保险公司风险厌恶程度增加而递减。当风险厌恶系数取值适中时,保险公司公平偏好的引入显著增加了合同的边际补偿率。
Breaking the convention of the"self-interest"hypothesis,we introduce the fairness preference of agent into the contract of risk compensation of science and technology insurance,and study the effect of fairness preference and risk aversion to the contract under the principle-agent framework.The results show that the marginal incentive coefficients increase with the level of fairness preference and the degree of government risk aversion increases,but decreases with the increase of degree of the insurance company risk aversion.When the degree of the risk aversion is moderate,fairness preference will remarkably add marginal compensation rate.
作者
罗琰
殷俊明
LUO Yan;YING Junming(School of Finance,Nanjing University of Audit,Nanjing 211815,China;School of accounting,Nanjing University of Audit,Nanjing 211815,China)
出处
《审计与经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第6期100-110,共11页
Journal of Audit & Economics
基金
国家社会科学基金资助项目(17AGL024,14BGL193)
江苏省高校哲学社会科学基金项目(2017SJB0343)
江苏省高校优势学科三期南京审计大学应用经济学(苏政办发[2018]87号)
关键词
公平偏好
风险厌恶
科技保险
风险补偿
委托-代理
fairness preference
risk aversion
science and technology insurance
risk compensation
principal-agent
