摘要
为了减少电子废旧产品通过非正规渠道回收带来的碳排放,基于政府所采取的静态措施、动态惩罚和补贴措施,构建政府和电子产品回收企业之间的演化博弈模型,从系统动力学角度研究政府和电子产品回收企业的渠道选择问题。研究表明:当政府采取动态惩罚或者动态补贴措施时,系统存在稳定的均衡点;在高惩罚力度和低补贴力度下,可以提高电子产品回收企业在正规渠道回收废旧产品的概率。政府可以通过在一定范围内加大惩罚或降低补贴,推动电子产品回收企业的正规渠道回收行为,达到低碳的目标。
In order to reduce the carbon emissions from the recycling of waste electronic products through informal channels,based on the static measures,the dynamic punishment and subsidy measures taken by the government,this paper constructed an evolutionary game model between the government and the electronic product recycling enterprises,and studied the channel selection of the government and the product electronic product recycling enterprises from the perspective of system dynamics.Research shows that when the government adopts dynamic punishment or dynamic subsidy measures,the system has a stable equilibrium point.Moreover,under the condition of high punishment and low subsidy,It can improve the probability of electronic product recycling enterprises to recycle waste products in formal channel.Therefore,the government can increase the punishment or reduce the subsidy to a certain extent to promote the formal channel products recycling behavior of electronic product recycling enterprises,so as to achieve the goal of low carbon.
作者
郎玲玲
刘峥
徐琪
余明阳
LANG Lingling;LIU Zheng;XU Qi;YU Mingyang(School of Management Studies,Shanghai University of Engineering Science,Shanghai 201620,China;Antai College of Economics and Management,ShanghaiJiao Tong University,Shanghai 200240,China;Glorious Sun School of Business and Management,Donghua University,Shanghai 200051,China)
出处
《东华大学学报（自然科学版）》
CAS
北大核心
2022年第4期116-125,共10页
Journal of Donghua University(Natural Science)
基金
国家自然科学基金青年基金项目(71901141)
上海科委软科学重点项目(21692195600)
公安部重点实验室项目(C20609)
上海市教委重点课程建设项目(S202003002)。
关键词
废旧电子产品
回收
渠道选择
演化博弈
系统动力学
waste electronic product
recycling
channel selection
evolutionary game
system dynamics
