摘要
北京冬奥会顺利落下帷幕,大力发展冰雪产业已上升为国家战略,其中冰雪服务质量提升至关重要。本文以演化博弈模型为基础,通过模拟仿真分析政府不同补贴激励策略对冰雪服务质量提升的影响。研究表明:1)产业补贴和消费补贴可以有效影响冰雪企业和冰雪运动消费者在冰雪服务过程中的参与度。低层次的产业补贴抑制冰雪服务质量的提升,中、高层次的产业补贴促进冰雪服务质量的提升,且产业补贴力度与冰雪服务质量提升的强度同向变动。2)低层次的消费补贴抑制冰雪服务质量的提升,中、高层次的消费补贴在前期短暂地抑制冰雪服务质量提升,但对消费者的刺激作用显著,最终对冰雪服务质量提升起到显著的促进作用。3)低、中层次的骗补惩罚抑制冰雪服务质量的提升,高层次的骗补惩罚对冰雪服务质量提升具有显著的促进作用。基于以上结论,总结三方演化博弈的最优策略,并提出设定中等产业和消费补贴、提升骗补惩罚力度等发展策略。
The Beijing Winter Olympics has come to an end smoothly.Boosting the ice and snow industry has become an important national strategy in China,among which the improvement of ice and snow service quality is very important.Based on the evolution game model,this paper analyzes the impact of different government subsidies and incentive strategies on the improvement of ice and snow service quality through simulation.The results are listed as follows:1) Industrial subsidies and ice and snow sports consumption subsidies can effectively affect the participation of ice and snow enterprises and consumers in the process of ice and snow services.Low level industrial subsidies inhibit the improvement of ice and snow service quality,medium and high-level industrial subsidies promote the improvement of ice and snow service quality,and the intensity of industrial subsidies changes in the same direction as the intensity of ice and snow ser-vice quality improvement.2) Low level consumption subsidies inhibit the improvement of ice and snow service quality,while medium and high-level consumption subsidies temporarily inhibit the improvement of ice and snow service quality in the early stage,but have a significant stimulating effect on consumers,and finally play a significant role in promoting the improvement of ice and snow service quality.3) Low and medium level fraudulent subsidies punishment can inhibit the improvement of ice and snow service quality,and high-level fraudulent subsidies punishment can significantly promote the improvement of ice and snow service quality.Based on the above conclusions,this paper summarizes the optimal strategy of the tripartite evolution game,and puts forward development strategies such as setting medium-sized industry and consumption subsidies and improving the intensity of fraudulent subsidies punishment.
作者
李岫儒
柴娇
LI Xiuru;CHAI Jiao(School of Physical Education,Northeast Normal University,Changchun 130024,Jilin,China)
出处
《沈阳体育学院学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2022年第4期14-21,共8页
Journal of Shenyang Sport University
基金
吉林省社科基金项目“文化生态视域下东北冰雪体育产业发展研究”(2021C96)。
关键词
政府补贴
冰雪企业
服务质量
演化博弈
冰雪运动消费者
government subsidy
ice and snow enterprise
service quality
evolution game
ice and snow sports consumer
