摘要
创新型城市建设是践行创新型国家战略迈出的坚实一步,在促进创新发展的同时,对地方政府债务也产生了深刻的影响。本文以创新型城市建设试点为外生冲击,探索其对城投债扩张的影响与作用机理。研究发现,创新型城市建设能显著推动城投债发债规模的扩大,其作用强度呈现先升后降的倒“U”型趋势;机制分析表明,这一效应的产生会通过与地方官员更替和晋升、地方创新赶超压力与要素配置等渠道叠加的间接路径实现;这一债务扩张作用在中西部、北方、一般地级市以及人口规模较小的城市样本中更突出,城市群建设与市场化改革有利于城投债规模的控制。因此,创新型城市的发展应以地方比较优势为遵循,建立弹性的考核标准,同时谨防因债务积累导致的债务风险。
Developing innovative cities is a powerful way to strengthen national innovation.However,promoting innovative development can significantly impact local government debt.This paper explored a new explanation for Chinese local government urban investment bond issuance growth with the effect of China’s innovative city pilot policy(ICPP).It was found that the ICPP implementation led to a significant expansion in the local government urban investment bond issuance scale,with the effect showing an inverted U-shaped trend of first rising and then falling.A further mechanism analysis found that the pilot city local governments were affected by indirect paths,such as the turnover and promotion of local officials,innovation catch-up pressure,and local production factor allocations.The ICPP effect on debt expansion was found to be heterogeneous in multiple dimensions,which as more prominent in non-eastern and northern cities,big cities,and cities with smaller populations and urban agglomeration and market-oriented reforms were found to be conducive to controlling the urban investment bond issuance scale.The results indicated that innovative city development needed to be based on local comparative advantages,that is,there needed to be flexible assessment criteria for the pilot cities,and that these cities needed to be aware of the risks resulting from debt accumulation.
作者
孙倩倩
周建军
Sun Qianqian;Zhou Jianjun
出处
《财经科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2022年第6期78-90,共13页
Finance & Economics
基金
教育部哲学社会科学研究重大课题攻关项目“社会科学本土化视角下的金融社会风险研究”(21JZD024)
国家自然科学基金面上项目“人口老龄化、住房空置与房地产金融风险控制——基于异质空间DSGE模型分析”(71873117)的资助。
关键词
城投债扩张
创新型城市
创新赶超压力
官员晋升
要素配置
Urban Investment Bond Expansion
Innovative City Pilot Policy
Innovation Catch-up Pressure
Turnover and Promotion of Local Officials
Production Factor Allocations
