摘要
本文以我国A股上市公司为研究样本,以高层梯队理论为基础,构建财务总监权力优势指标,实证检验财务总监权力优势对企业非效率投资的影响以及产品市场竞争的调节效应。研究发现:财务总监权力优势有效抑制了公司非效率投资行为,产品市场竞争对上述两者的关系具有一定的调节效应;在非国有企业中,财务总监权力优势更有利于提高公司投资效率,产品市场竞争在国有企业数据组中的调节效应更为显著。
The paper takes Chinese A-share companies as the research sample,constructs the CFO's power advantage index based on the upper echelon theory,and empirically tests the influence of CFO's power advantage on enterprise non-efficient investment and the regulatory effect of product market competition.It is found that CFO's power advantage effectively inhibits the non-efficient investment behavior of the company,and product market competition has a moderating effect on the relationship between the above two.Further study shows that in non-state-owned enterprises,CFO's power advantage is more conducive to improving firm's investment efficiency;the moderating effect of product market competition is more significant in the data set of state-owned enterprises.
作者
张圣利
王丽娟
ZHANG Shengli;WANG Lijuan(School of Finance and Economics, Henan Polytechnic University, Jiaozuo 454000, Henan, China;Zhengzhou Business University, Zhengzhou 451200, Henan, China)
出处
《河南理工大学学报（社会科学版）》
2022年第5期57-64,共8页
Journal of Henan Polytechnic University:Social Sciences
基金
河南省重点研发与推广专项(软科学)项目(212400410567)。
关键词
财务总监权力优势
非效率投资
产品市场竞争
国有企业
非国有企业
CFO's power advantage
non-efficient investment
product market competition
state-owned enterprises
non-state-owned enterprises
