摘要
以2008—2020年沪深A股上市公司为样本,运用Lennox审计意见购买模型,从事务所变更维度考察董事高管责任保险(D&O保险)对管理层审计意见购买的影响。研究表明,D&O保险发挥了积极的治理效应,抑制了审计意见购买行为。从审计意见购买动机看,这一治理作用在高管业绩压力较大、经营风险和被诉风险较高的样本中更显著;从审计意见购买实现条件看,这一治理作用在事务所规模小且无行业专长、客户重要性水平较高的样本中更显著。进一步地,审计意见成功购买损害了未来盈余披露质量,而D&O保险的引入能够明显改善审计意见成功购买带来的不良经济后果。机制检验发现,D&O保险通过“信息质量渠道”和“代理成本渠道”作用于审计意见购买。控制潜在的内生性问题后,结论依旧稳健。
Taking Chinese A-share listed companies from 2008 to 2020 as samples,this paper uses the audit opinion purchasing model of Lennox to investigate the impact of D&O insurance on audit opinion purchasing behavior from the perspective of firm change.The research shows that D&O insurance has a positive governance effect and inhibits the purchase behavior of audit opinions.From the perspective of the motivation of audit opinion purchase,this governance effect is more significant in the samples with high pressure of executive performance,high operational risk and litigation risk.From the perspective of the realization conditions of audit opinion purchase,this governance effect is more significant in the samples with small firm size,no industry expertise and high client importance levels.Furthermore,the successful purchase of audit opinions damages the quality of future earnings disclosure,and the introduction of D&O insurance can significantly improve the adverse economic consequences caused by the successful purchase of audit opinions.The mechanism inspection found that D&O insurance acts on the purchase of audit opinions through the“information quality channel”and the“agent cost channel”.The conclusion is still stable after controlling potential endogenous problems.
作者
于亚洁
郭世奇
王春燕
YU Yajie;GUO Shiqi;WANG Chunyan(School of Accounting,Central University of Finance and Economics,Beijing 100081,China;Baker Tilly International Accounting Firm with Special General Partnership,Beijing 100048,China;School of Accounting,Shandong University of Finance and Economics,Jinan 250000,China)
出处
《南京审计大学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2022年第3期40-50,共11页
Journal of Nanjing Audit University
基金
山东省自然科学基金项目(ZR2021QG043)。
