摘要
董事高管责任保险被视为一种新兴的公司外部治理机制,近年来在发达国家受到重视,在我国其治理功能如何、对公司绩效产生怎样的影响,需要进行相关的研究。基于我国上市公司2009-2015年数据,本文运用混合截面最小二乘法、倾向得分匹配法和Heckman两阶段分析等方法,实证检验董事高管责任险与上市公司市场绩效和财务绩效的关系。研究结果表明,董事高管责任险与上市公司市场绩效呈显著正相关,而与上市公司财务绩效却呈显著负相关,这说明董事高管责任险的激励效应与机会主义行为并存。上述研究结果为我国上市公司认识董事高管责任险的治理职能、促进我国现代企业制度建设提供了经验支持,因此应积极引入董事高管责任险,加强上市公司治理制度建设,促进机制间交互治理作用的发挥。
Directors＇ and officers＇ liability（ DO） insurance is regarded as a new external governance mechanism,which has been paid more attention in developed countries. How its governance function and the impact on the performance of the company need to be studied in China. Based on the data of Chinese listed companies from 2009 to 2015,the relationships among DO,market performance and financial performance were tested by the methods of pooled least squares,PSM and Heckman two stages method. The results showed that DO had a significant positive influence on market performance,but had a significant negative influence on financial performance,which meant that incentive effect and opportunism behavior coexisted. The results provided an empirical basis for listed companies to deeply understand DO and to strengthen the construction of modern enterprise system. Therefore,we should introduce liability insurance into companies and improve the construction of governance system to improve the governance function of DO.
作者
凌士显
白锐锋
LING Shi-xian BAI Rui-feng(Business School of Shandong University, Weihai 264209, Chin)
出处
《商业研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第10期78-86,共9页
Commercial Research
基金
山东省社科项目"金融结构优化与经济增长方式转变关系研究"
项目编号:15CJJJ16
关键词
董事责任保险
市场绩效
财务绩效
激励效应
机会主义
directors＇ and officers＇ liability insurance
market performance
financial performance
incentive effect
opportunism behavior
