摘要
债券违约或预期违约频发的背景下,债券契约修改就成为必经之路,但债券作为标准化证券的涉众性使得如何聚合持有人的意见并获得其同意成为关键。在我国市场实践中,存在着大额债券持有人压迫小额债券持有人的问题。域外立法解决“压迫问题”的路径呈现实体保护与程序保护上的差异化。美国的做法是交换要约,德国和日本则为债券持有人会议制度。不同路径背后所蕴含的是对债券持有人本息受偿这一根本性权利的立法差异,在更大的层面上,这与各法域惯有的债券投资者权益保护机制及配套制度支撑的差异相关联。我国既有大陆法系彰显债券持有人集体权利行使的债券持有人会议制度,又有英美法系保障债券持有人核心个体性权利的债券置换。两种制度本身各有缺陷,叠加使用还存在兼容性问题。鉴于我国债券持有人保护架构及配套制度,完善债券持有人会议制度及配套法制更符合我国的历史传统及现实诉求。
Under the background of frequent bond defaults or expected defaults, the modification of bond contracts to protect the rights of bondholders has become the only way to go.However, since the nature of bonds is standardized securities, it is essential to aggregate the opinions of bondholders and obtain their agreement.In Chinese market practice, there is a problem that large bondholders oppress small bondholders.The path of extraterritorial legislation to solve the“oppression problem”presents a difference between substantive protection and procedural protection.The US approach is exchange offer, while Germany and Japan are bondholders’ meeting systems.What lies behind it is the legislative difference between the fundamental right of bondholders to receive the principal and interest.On a larger level, this discrepancy is related to the differences in bond investor rights protection mechanisms and their supporting systems in various jurisdictions.China has not only a bondholder meeting system in the continental law system that highlights the exercise of the collective rights of bondholders, but also a bond replacement in the common law system that protects the core individual rights of bondholders.The two systems themselves are not perfect, and there are compatibility issues between them.Considering our country’s bondholder protection structure and the existing supporting system, perfecting the bondholder meeting system and its supporting legal system is more in line with our country’s historical tradition and realistic demands.
出处
《财经法学》
CSSCI
2022年第3期128-145,共18页
Law and Economy
