摘要
以产品众筹为背景,运用排队模型分析了keep-it-all (KIA)模式下延时敏感投资者的投资行为,进而讨论了项目发起人实现单位时间利润最大化的最优项目周期和价格决策.结果表明,项目的单位时间利润随产品价格的增加和项目周期的延长呈单峰分布.通过适当降低价格和延长周期或者提高价格和缩短周期能减小随机因素波动对项目单位时间利润的影响.最后,数值结果表明随机因素对利润的影响程度由高到低分别是项目履约率,生产边际成本,潜在投资者数量,单位延时成本,生产固定成本.
This paper analyzes the investment behaviors of delay-sensitive investors in keep-it-all(KIA) mechanism for reward-based crowdfunding with a queueing model and examines the project sponsor’s optimal decisions on project duration and product price to maximize the profit per unit time.The results show that the unit time profit is unimodal in the product price and project duration.Reducing price and extending cycle duration,or raising price and shortening cycle duration,can mitigate the impact of random factors on profit.Finally,numerical studies show that the key random factors in descending order in terms of the impact of project profitability are fulfillment rate of the project,marginal production cost,investor’s potential arrival rate,unit delay cost and fixed production cost.
作者
王冬梅
周文慧
陈妍
Wang Dongmei;Zhou Wenhui;Chen Yan(School of Business Administration,South China University of Technology,Guangzhou 510641,China;Institute of Big Data and Internet Innovation,Hunan University of Technology and Business,Changsha 410205,China)
出处
《系统工程学报》
CSCD
北大核心
2022年第1期23-39,共17页
Journal of Systems Engineering
基金
国家杰出青年科学基金资助项目(71925002)
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71731006,71971080,71601077)。
关键词
众筹
产品价格
项目周期
延时敏感
排队经济学
crowdfunding
product price
project duration
delay sensitive
queueing economics
