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行为者中心限制与行为者中心特权——谢弗勒“混合理论”述评

Agent-centered Restrictions and Agent-centered Prerogative: A Review of Schaeffler’s "Mixed Theory"
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摘要 谢弗勒是美国当代重要的伦理学家。为回应威廉斯对后果主义破坏人的完整性异议,他提出了行为者中心限制和行为者特权的“混合理论”。这一理论前半部分强调行为者受到道义论的限制,从而不可能为了后果最大化好而做后果主义所要求的事;后半部分则认为人们可以追求行动最大化好的后果,但并不应把后果主义的原则应用到一切行为之中,同时认为,行为者有自己的特权,即可以为了自己的利益追求放大M倍来为自己辩护。谢弗勒的“混合理论”两个方面都受到批评,其实是一种对后果主义的有益改进。 SamuelSchaeffler is an important contemporary American ethicist.In response to Williams’ objection that consequentialism destroys human being’s integrity, he puts forward a mixed theory of agent-centered restriction and agent-centered privilege.The first half of this theory emphasizes that the agent is restricted by deontology, so that he cannot do what consequentialism requires for the sake of maximizing the consequences;the second half thinks that people can seek the best consequence of actions, but they should not apply the principle to all behaviors.At the same time, the agent has his own prerogative, that is to say, he can spare no effort to defend himself for his own pursuit of interests.Although both aspects of Schaeffler’s mixed theory have been criticized, it may be a beneficial improvement for the consequentialism.
作者 龚群 吴峰鑫 GONG Qun;WU Fengxin(Institute of Philosophy,Renmin University of China,Beijing 100872,China)
出处 《吉首大学学报(社会科学版)》 CSSCI 2022年第2期41-50,共10页 Journal of Jishou University(Social Sciences)
基金 中国人民大学国家治理现代化平台与应用伦理学跨学科重大规划创新平台2022年度“中央高校建设世界一流大学(学科)和特色发展引导专项资金”项目 国家社会科学基金重大项目(21&ZD015)。
关键词 行为者中心限制 行为者中心特权 后果主义 混合理论 谢弗勒 agent-centered restrictions agent-centered prerogative consequentialism mixed theory Schaeffler
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