摘要
在绿色低碳供应链中,核心企业何时审查其供应商的绿色低碳状况以及如何选择激励策略是重要的研究问题。基于此,文章构建了由上游绿色低碳产品供应商与下游绿色低碳产品零售商组成的供应链博弈模型,比较了核心企业零售商事前与事后审查供应商低碳技术能力状况下的均衡结果,并考察了零售商对供应商的基于低碳技术投资成本分担和产品绿色质量投资成本分担的激励策略。均衡结果表明:①零售商选择事后审查供应商低碳技术能力更有助于供应商低碳技术水平、产品绿色质量水平、消费者绿色低碳产品需求及供应链业绩的提升;②无论零售商采取的激励策略类型如何,其低碳技术投资成本分担比例均为固定且保持不变,此外,其决策的产品绿色质量投资成本分担比例也是固定的;③零售商、消费者和政府均偏好于同时采取低碳技术和绿色质量激励策略,而供应商和供应链系统更愿意不采取任何激励策略。
In green and low carbon supply chains,when core enterprises examine their suppliers’green and low carbon performance and how to choose the incentive strategies are important questions.Based on this,by building a game model in the supply chain consisting of an upstream green and low carbon product supplier and a downstream green and low carbon product retailer,we compare equilibrium results between the ex-ante and the ex-post examination modes implemented by the dominant retailer for the supplier s low carbon technology capability,and examine the incentive strategies based on the low carbon technology investment cost-sharing contract and the green quality investment cost-sharing contract.The equilibrium results show that:(1)The ex-post mode the retailer chooses to examine the supplier s low-carbon technology capability can lead to an increase in the supplier s low carbon technology level,the green quality level,the consumer s demand for the green and low carbon product,and the supply chain performance.(2)No matter what incentive strategies the retailer chooses,the ratios of the low carbon technology investment cost the retailer shares with the supplier are exogenous and remain unchanged.In addition,the ratio of the green quality investment cost-sharing the retailer decides is still exogenous.(3)The retailer,the consumer,and the government prefer the incentive strategy to adopt the low carbon technology and the green quality,but both the supplier and the total supply chain system prefer not to take any incentive strategy.
作者
范建昌
陈双双
陈威
万娜娜
李余辉
FAN Jian-chang;CHEN Shuang-shuang;CHEN Wei;WAN Na-na;LI Yu-hui(School of Marketing and Logistics Management,Nanjing University of Finance&Economics,Nanjing,Jiangsu 210023;College of Management Science,Chengdu University of Technology,Chengdu,Sichuan 610059;School of Economics and Management,Southwest University of Science and Technology,Mianyang,Sichuan 621010;Business School,Guilin University of Electronic Technology,Guilin,Guangxi 541004)
出处
《供应链管理》
2021年第12期36-49,共14页
SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT
基金
国家自然科学基金青年项目“基于产品责任与追溯视角的工业化食品供应链运作决策研究”(72002094)
国家自然科学基金青年项目“通货膨胀环境下基于期权合同的供应链运营决策和双边协调”(71802168)
教育部人文社会科学研究项目“资金约束下供应链绿色运营决策与外部融资决策研究”(20YJC630020)
教育部人文社会科学研究项目“考虑通货膨胀和期权合同的供应链决策优化与协调机制研究”(18YJC630165)
南京市留学人员科技创新项目“工业化食品供应链质量控制与追溯体系建立研究”(FJCZL21001)。
关键词
供应链
低碳技术
绿色质量
激励策略
supply chain
low carbon technology
green quality
incentive strategy
