摘要
从企业集团框架内的特殊委托代理关系出发,对母子公司高管协同配置与上市公司现金股利政策之间的关系进行实证分析,结果显示:母子公司高管协同程度越高,上市公司越倾向于实施积极的现金股利政策;股权制衡程度越低,母子公司高管协同配置对上市公司现金股利政策的正向影响越强;基金持股比例越低,母子公司高管协同配置对上市公司现金股利政策的正向影响越强;国有企业与非国有企业在母子公司高管协同配置对上市公司现金股利政策的影响中不存在显著差别。此研究验证了集团公司治理机制的特殊性与复杂性,丰富了母子公司治理的理论研究框架,可以为母子公司治理体系设计提供借鉴,对上市公司现金股利政策或其他治理决策的制定与实施具有指导意义。
Starting from the special entrusted agent relationship within the framework of enterprise group, this study empirically analyzes the relationship between senior executives’ collaborative configuration in parent-subsidiary companies and the cash dividend policy of listed companies. The results show that the higher the degree of senior executives’ coordination between parent-subsidiary companies, the more the listed companies tend to implement positive cash dividend policy;the lower the degree of equity check and balance, the stronger the positive impact of senior executives’ collaborative configuration in parent-subsidiary companies on listed companies’ cash dividend policy;the lower the proportion of fund holding, the stronger the positive impact of senior executives’ collaborative configuration in parent-subsidiary companies on listed companies’ cash dividend policy;and that there exists no significant difference between state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises in the impact of senior executives’ collaborative configuration in parent-subsidiary companies on listed companies’ cash dividend policy. The research conclusion verifies the particularity and complexity of group corporate governance mechanism, enriches the theoretical research framework of parent-subsidiary corporate governance, provides reference for the design of parent-subsidiary corporate governance system, and has guiding significance for the formulation and implementation of listed companies’ cash dividend policy or other governance decisions.
作者
徐鹏
赵静
王文娟
XU Peng;ZHAO Jing;WANG Wenjuan(School of Business Administration,Shandong Unitersity of Finance and Economics,Jinan 250014,China;Corporate Governance Research Center,Shandong Unirersity of Finance and Economics,Jinan 250014,China)
出处
《山东财经大学学报》
2022年第1期97-107,共11页
Journal of Shandong University of Finance and Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目“母子公司高管协同配置驱动机制及效应研究——基于公司治理视角的探索”(71972117)
国家自然科学基金青年项目“集团框架内子公司动态竞争行为决策动因及协同效应——基于多层次情境因素的研究”(71602099)
泰山学者工程专项经费项目(tsqn202103095)。
关键词
高管协同
现金股利政策
企业集团
委托代理
公司治理
senior executive’s collaboration
cash dividend policy
enterprise group
entrusted agent
corporate governance
