摘要
通过研究2016—2018年深沪两市非金融上市公司的相关数据,分析了CEO股权激励对企业并购决策的驱动机制,采用实证分析法检验了CEO股权激励对企业并购事件和企业并购规模的影响。研究显示:CEO股权激励与企业并购事件具有显著相关性,企业发起并购事件的概率会随着CEO股权激励强度的增大而提高,CEO股权激励对企业并购规模产生显著的积极影响,当企业CEO股权激励强度越大,企业并购规模越大。两职分离在一定程度上能够调节CEO股权激励与上市公司并购决策之间的关系,能够正向调节CEO股权激励对上市公司并购规模的影响。
Based on the relevant data of non-financial listed companies in Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchanges from 2016 to 2018,this paper analyzes the driving mechanism of CEO equity incentive on M&A decision-making,and specifically uses empirical analysis method to test the impact of CEO equity incentive on M&A events and the impact of CEO equity incentive on M&A scale.The results show that CEO equity incentive has a significant correlation with M&A events,and the probability of M&A events will increase with the increase of CEO equity incentive intensity;CEO equity incentive has a significant positive impact on the scale of M&A,and the larger the CEO equity incentive intensity is,the larger the scale of M&A will be.To a certain extent,the separation of two duties has a moderating effect on the relationship between CEO equity incentive and M&A decision-making of listed companies.The separation of two duties positively moderates the impact of CEO equity incentive on M&A scale of listed companies.
作者
耿一丁
GENG Yiding(Finance and Economics Branch, Panjin Vocational and Technical College, Panjin 124000, China)
出处
《广东石油化工学院学报》
2021年第6期86-92,共7页
Journal of Guangdong University of Petrochemical Technology
