摘要
针对军用技术创新中政府部门提供补贴激励民营企业投入技术研发问题,构建动态规划模型,研究了企业的最优技术投入以及多个企业技术投入的马尔可夫完美均衡策略,在此基础上,讨论了政府部门如何在固定额度补贴与按比例匹配补贴方式间选择的策略问题.研究结果表明,与多个企业进行研发竞赛不同,企业垄断技术情况下,其技术投入有两种不同的情形.多个企业进行研发竞赛情况下,技术溢出效果存在使得企业技术投入有三种不同的情形.政府选择研发补贴形式要考虑创新产品可能实现的社会福利、现有成熟产品给企业带来的收益以及消费者剩余、参与企业数量、技术溢出效果等因素影响.
Government departments always provide subsidies to private firms to encourage private enterprises to invest in RD of military technology innovation.Dynamic programming model is used to study firm’s optimal RD investment and non-cooperative firms’symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium strategies.And then,two different types of RD subsidies are distinguished:one kind of subsidy is the fixed amount subsidy;the other is to match the additional funding in proportion to firm’s RD spending.The findings suggest there are two different circumstances of technology investment in the case of monopoly technology RD,while there are three different situations in the case of RD competition.The strategy of governments to decide the form of RD subsidies is also obtained.The social welfare brought about by innovation products,the benefits and consumer surplus of existing mature products,the number of participating enterprises and technology spillover effect should be analyzed when the government chooses the forms of subsidy.
作者
海江涛
仲伟俊
Hai Jiangtao;Zhong Weijun(School of Management,Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications,Nanjing 210023,China;School of Business,Henan University,Kaifeng 475004,China;School of Economics and Management,Southeast University,Nanjing 211189,China)
出处
《系统工程学报》
CSCD
北大核心
2021年第5期625-637,共13页
Journal of Systems Engineering
基金
江苏省社科基金资助项目(19GLB012)
中国博士后科学基金资助项目(2019M651406)
科技创新战略研究专项资助项目(ZLY2015108).
关键词
研发补贴
军用技术创新
军民协同
社会福利
R&D subsidy
military technology innovation
military-civil collaboration
social welfare
