摘要
在“双一流”建设背景下,高校抢挖人才现象愈演愈烈。高校是否参与人才抢挖,不仅取决于其对抢挖人才所获得收益的评估,还取决于同类院校的抉择。借助囚徒困境的经典博弈理论,分析高校抢挖人才现象的本质,构建高校抢挖人才的单次与重复博弈模型,探讨高校在完全竞争和政府干预环境下的博弈策略选择,为问题的治理提供新的分析视角。在具体实践中,为实现良治,高校应采取摈弃非合作博弈思维,强化共赢的集体理性;政府应强化自身的委托人身份,增强对人才流动的监管能力,加大对抢挖行为的惩罚力度,并引入人才流动的补偿机制。
Under the background of"double first-class"construction,the phenomenon of universities'scrambling for talents is becoming more and more intense.Whether universities participate in talent competition depends not only on their evaluation of the benefits of talent competition,but also on the choice of similar universities.With the help of the classical game theory of prisoner's dilemma,this paper analyzes the essence of the phenomenon of universities'scrambling for talents,constructs the single and repeated game model of universities'scrambling for talents,and discusses the game strategy choice of universities in the environment of complete competition and government inter-vention,so as to provide a new analytical perspective for the governance of the problem.In practice,in order to achieve good governance,universities should abandon the thinking of non cooperative game and strengthen the collective rationality of win-win.And the government should strengthen its client identity,improve the supervision ability of talent flow,strengthen the punishment of rush excavation,and introduce the compensation mechanism of talent flow.
出处
《重庆第二师范学院学报》
2021年第5期18-23,127,共7页
Journal of Chongqing University of Education
基金
广西研究生教育创新计划项目“西部地方高校治理体系和治理能力现代化研究”(YCBZ2020030)。
关键词
“双一流”建设
人才流动
囚徒困境
"double first-class"construction
talent flow
prisoner's dilemma
