摘要
在《理性与自发性》中葛瑞汉提出了有关理性和自发性的论述,来解释休谟的“是”与“应该”之间著名的差距:从关于事实的陈述句无法在逻辑上得出有关价值的规范性陈述。葛瑞汉认为“有意识”的第一原则可以作为事实和价值这两者的根据,因为我们的目的建立在自然倾向而不是理性的基础上。他提出了有关价值的理论,该理论将所有的价值建立在“有意识”的规定的基础上,这个规定来自于《庄子》,葛瑞汉认为是“反理性主义”。本文从后续的哲学争论和心理学、生物学领域中的研究来回应葛瑞汉的哲学和来自于经验的观点。本文第一个部分讨论几种有关自律的研究之间的共通之处,以及葛瑞汉对以意识(而不是绝对理性)为主要特征的自然倾向的论述,这种自然倾向被当作行动机制和各种目的之间的选择的基础。第二个部分讨论他来自于经验的观点,并展示近来有关行动机制的生物学研究如何证实了他的观点。最后,第三个部分提出了一个葛瑞汉分析得欠准确的观点,涉及到他对人和动物所作的刻板区分。
In Reason and Spontaneity,Graham proposes an account of reason and spontaneity intended to address Hume’s famous lacuna between“is”and“ought”:that no normative statement about values can be derived logically from declarative statements about facts.Graham argues that a first principle of“Be aware”can serve as a ground of both fact and value,because our ends are grounded not in reason but in inclinations.He proposes a theory of value that grounds all values in the imperative to“be aware”,an approach explicitly derived from the Zhuangzi,which he identifies with“anti-rationalism”.This paper responds to Graham’s philosophical and empirical arguments in the light of subsequent arguments in philosophy and subsequent research in several areas of psychology and biology.In the first section I address resonances between several strands of research on autonomy and Graham’s account of inclination informed by awareness(rather than unmitigated reason)as the basis for agency and choices among ends.In the second section,I turn to his empirical argument,and show how it is supported by recent research on the biology of agency.Finally,in the third section I take up one point where I think his argument may miss the mark,is in his rigid distinction between humans and animals.
作者
柴婕(译)
Lisa Raphals;CHAI Jie(Department of Comparative Literature and Foreign Languages,University of California,Riverside,Riverside CA 92521-0321,USA;College of Humanities,Shenzhen University,Shenzhen 518060,China)
出处
《齐鲁学刊》
CSSCI
2021年第5期28-36,共9页
Qilu Journal
关键词
葛瑞汉
动物
庄子
自律
意识
《理性与自发性》
Graham,A.C.
animals
Zhuangzi
autonomy
awareness
Reason and Spontaneity
