摘要
本文基于2006—2016年商业银行、保险公司、证券公司、基金公司以及信托公司等金融机构股权数据,以追溯前十大股东最终控制人的方式识别地方金控集团,由此构造地方金控集团样本。在此基础上,实证检验地方金控集团关联资金借贷对过度投资的影响,并进一步考察地方金控集团政府属性的作用。研究发现,地方金控集团内的关联资金借贷比例越高,越有可能出现过度投资;地方金控集团的政府属性加强了关联资金借贷与过度投资的正向关系,表现为当地方金控集团对政府的重要性越高,所属地区的GDP排名越落后,以及地方政策的不确定性越低时,过度投资受关联资金借贷的影响更为显著。
Based on the equity data of financial institutions such as commercial banks, insurance companies, securities companies, fund companies, and trust companies from 2006 to 2016, this paper identifies local financial holding groups by tracing back the ultimate controllers of the top ten shareholders, thus constructing local financial holding groups sample. On this basis, empirically test the influence of local financial holding group′s related lending on over-investment, and further examine the role of local financial holding group′s government attribute. It is found that the higher the proportion of related capital lending in local financial holding groups, the more likely there is over-investment. The government attribute of the local financial holding group strengthens the positive relationship between related lending and over-investment. When the importance of local financial holding groups to the government is higher, the GDP ranking of their regions is lower, and the uncertainty of local policies is lower, the impact of related capital lending on over-investment is more significant.
作者
何美玲
岳中刚
李婵娟
HE Mei-ling;YUE Zhong-gang;LI Chan-juan(School of Economics,Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications,Nanjing 210023,China)
出处
《现代财经（天津财经大学学报）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2021年第9期43-60,共18页
Modern Finance and Economics：Journal of Tianjin University of Finance and Economics
基金
国家社会科学基金项目(17AJY029)
教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(18YJC790072)。
关键词
地方金控集团
关联资金借贷
过度投资
local financial holding group
related lending
over-investment
