摘要
近年来公司治理领域的相关研究表明,公司治理机制的联合使用能够发挥更有力的治理作用,即所谓“二人同心,其利断金”。然而,并非所有的联合机制都符合上述预期。本文采用我国2007-2017年沪深两市A股主板上市公司为研究样本,并选择高管超额薪酬为研究视角,实证检验了高管薪酬契约有效性和公司现金股利政策的公司治理作用。结果发现,提高高管薪酬契约有效性和公司的现金股利水平均有助于抑制高管获得超额薪酬,但同时提升高管薪酬契约有效性和公司现金股利水平反而会发挥相反的作用,该结论在一系列稳健性检验后依然成立。进一步基于企业生命周期视角的机制分析发现,上述结论的产生源于高管薪酬契约和公司现金股利政策均具有一定的生命周期特征。研究结论明确了公司联合治理机制的局限性,为公司进一步完善内外治理机制提供了依据,也为相关领域的研究提供了新的视角。
In recent years,relevant research in the field of corporate governance shows that the joint use of corporate governance mechanisms can play a more powerful role in governance,which is so-called strength lies in unity.However,not all joint mechanisms are consistent with the above idea.Based on the perspective of executives,overpayment,this paper chooses a panel sample of A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2017 to analyze the governance role of the effectiveness of compensation contract and cash dividend policy empirically.Results show that:both improving the effectiveness of compensation contract and the company's cash dividend level can decrease the executives'overpayment singly,whereas increasing them in the meantime performs the opposite effect.The above conclusion is still found under a series of robust tests.A further analysis of mechanism based on life cycle perspective shows that both the executive compensation contract and cash dividend policy perform a life cycle characteristic.Conclusions of this paper clarify that joint governance has its limitations,which providing a basis for companies to further improve internal and external governance mechanisms,and a new sight for the research in related fields.
作者
陈晓珊
施赟
Xiaoshan Chen;Yun Shi(School of Accounting,Guangdong University of Finance and Economics,Guangzhou,China)
出处
《南大商学评论》
2021年第1期162-183,共22页
Nanjing Business Review
基金
广东省自然科学基金联合基金项目“实际控制人的境外居留权与企业创新:作用机制、经济后果与对策”(2019A1515111017)
国家自然科学基金青年项目“中国上市公司财务报告内控缺陷的认定标准及实施效果研究”(71902038)
关键词
薪酬契约有效性
现金股利
高管超额薪酬
Effectiveness of Compensation Contract
Cash Dividend
Executives'Overpayment
