摘要
本文研究了高管在获得超额薪酬时是否披露了更多的战略信息,并进一步检验了此时战略信息披露动机符合管理者才能信号假说还是薪酬辩护假说。结果表明,战略信息披露与超额薪酬正相关,且在国企尤其是央企中、薪酬业绩敏感性较低以及机构投资者持股比例较低的公司中两者正相关性更强,这表明两者的关系符合薪酬辩护假说,即高管在获得超额薪酬时,为了提高薪酬的正当性和合理性,会披露较多的战略信息来展现自己的才能。本文从高管薪酬辩护视角考察了信息披露的动机,特别是在发展中国家的制度背景下丰富了有关信息披露动机的研究。
This paper examines whether executives disclose more information on strategy （SID）when whey ob- tain excess compensation, and further examines whether the motivation is consistent with the Management talent signaling hypothesis or Justifying Compensation hypothesis. We find excess compensation and SID is positively related, and this relation is more likely to happen when the company is SOEs, especially central enterprises, when the PPS is lower or when the institutional investors holding is lower, which is consistent with Justifying Compensation hypothesis. That means when executives obtain excess compensation, whey will disclose more SID to show their false ability in order to improve their compensation＇ s legitimate and rationality. This paper studies information disclosure motivation from the executive justifying compensation perspective, extending the research on information disclosure incentives in the context of developing countries.
出处
《金融研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第12期146-161,共16页
Journal of Financial Research
基金
中国特色社会主义经济建设协同创新中心(CICCE)项目
教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地-南开大学中国公司治理研究院重大项目(13JJD630004)
天津市科技发展战略规划项目资助
关键词
超额薪酬
战略信息披露
管理者才能信号假说
薪酬辩护假说
Excess compensation, Information disclosure on strategy, Management talent signaling hypothesis,Justifying compensation hypothesis
