摘要
以2005~2014年A股民营上市公司为研究样本,考察了由领导权分离引起的权力削弱是否会引致相应的薪酬补偿。研究结果表明,在领导权分离过程中,仅有权力受到削弱的原高层管理人员才会获得薪酬补偿,而权力未受到削弱的原高层管理人员并未获得薪酬补偿;权力削弱程度越高,原高层管理人员所获薪酬补偿越多。研究还发现,存在权力补偿的公司其后续业绩表现较差,这表明权力补偿对上市公司而言更可能是一种效率损失。研究结果揭示了领导权分离过程中的"黑箱",为进一步分析中国情境下民营企业的领导权配置提供了新的思路。
Based on the panel data of Chinese A-share private listed companies from 2005 to 2014, this study explores whether the weaken power originated from leadership separation will result in salary compensation. It is found that only previous executives will receive compensation when there is high level weakened power, and there will be no compensation when little power is weakened. Furthermore we find that companies with power compensation experience worse operation performance, which suggests that power compensation might be a kind of efficiency loss. This research proves the power compensation effect of leadership separation process, also enriches the research on the private companies＇ leadership change.
出处
《管理学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第6期789-797,共9页
Chinese Journal of Management
基金
国家自然科学基金资助重点项目(71533002)
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71572081)
关键词
股权集中
领导权分离
权力削弱
权力补偿
concentrated ownership
leadership separation
power weakened
power compensation effect
