摘要
董事会分离原本两职合一的领导权结构包含了充分的信息传递过程。基于代理理论,从董事会开启分离决议的视角,探讨以企业价值变动为主导的董事会分离两职合一决策的内在机理。以2006年至2013年中国沪、深两市A股上市公司为样本,选择董事会领导权变更数据,通过构建Probit和Logistic模型回归进行实证研究。研究结果表明,董事会领导权结构中董事长与CEO两职合一向分离转化并不都是企业在价值下降时出于缓和代理问题所致。两职合一向分离转化时,企业价值越高,越倾向于一种过渡形式的分离,即学徒式分离,这是基于企业战略继任的需要;两职合一向分离转化时,企业价值越低,则越倾向于离职式分离和降职式分离,顺应了企业缓和代理问题的需要。进一步的研究表明,独立董事对于董事会的分离决议没有明显促进作用,而高管个人职业生涯潜力对于董事会分离决议有明显的调节作用。上市公司两职合一向分离转化随着类型不一所传递的信息不同,包含了价值变动、战略继任和代理问题等多种信息。
Separating the CEO and board chair duality in leadership structure by the board of directors contains substantial infor- mation conveying process. The paper presents a comprehensive process from leadership duality to separation due to the agency problem and strategic succession. Based on the agency theory, this paper specifically discusses the inner mechanism in separa- ting CEO duality led by firm value changes from the perspective of separation of board directors. The firm value changes include Return on Asset and Return on Equity from the accounting measurement dimension, and abnormal returns in market and Tobin＇s Q from the market value measurement dimension. Taking companies listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share market during 2006 to 2013 as samples, this study selected the sam- pies where companies＇ CEO and board chair was consolidated in one year, yet separated in the following year. By constructing I^gistic and Probit regression models based on the changing data of board leadership, this study found that in the leadership structure, the shift to separating CEO duality was not all caused by alleviating the agency problems while firm values decreased. When CEO duality converted to separation, enterprises with high firm values tends to apprenticeship separation and apprentice- ship separation begins when one person holds the positions as CEO and also as board chair. This study found apprenticeship sep- aration is just a transitional form of separation, and usually based on the enterprise strategic succession. Enterprises with low firms＇ value tend to departure and demotion separation, conforming to the needs of agency problems alleviation. The departure and the demotion separation is the punishment for leaders, where departure separation is the complete separation of CEO and board chair with each position selecting a new person to succeed; In regard to demotion separation, where CEO and board chair is separated, but the former still holds the position as CEO only with a new board chair elected. Furth
出处
《管理科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第3期1-13,共13页
Journal of Management Science
基金
国家自然科学基金(71272184)
教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目(11JJD630005)
南开大学"985工程"中国企业管理与制度创新基地资助项目(1050821210)~~
关键词
企业价值
两职合一
学徒式分离
离职式分离
降职式分离
独立董事
高管职业生涯
firm value
CEO duality
apprenticeship separation
departure separation
demotion separation
independent directors
CEO carrion
