摘要
水环境治理PPP项目中政府和社会资本方之间的博弈行为将会影响项目的治理效果。论文为研究利益主体的合作机制,构建以水环境治理特点为基础的"政府-社会资本方"的演化博弈模型,以政府(监管,不监管)和社会资本方(积极合作,投机)为策略建立支付矩阵,根据不同的博弈行为分别讨论双方的演化稳定策略,揭示了各行为因素对于理想稳定策略(监管,积极合作)的影响,并运用Matlab软件进行算例仿真分析。结果表明:当政府的监管成本和社会资本方的努力成本降低、双方积极合作时获得的收益较多、政府对社会资本方治理行为的奖惩力度加大时,双方行为的演化越趋向于共赢的局面。针对研究结果提出了完善监管制度、优化奖惩机制、促进技术创新等有利于水环境治理项目高效实施的建议,以促进在实际项目中提升双方合作效益。
The gaming behaviors between governments and investors in water environmental governance PPP projects will impact the effectiveness.This paper,aiming at their cooperating mechanism,establishes an evolutional gaming model between government and investors in water environmental governance based on a payment matrix on the basis of government(administrating or not)and investors(cooperative or opportunistic),and discusses their evolutional stability strategy,and reveals the impacts of behaviors on ideal stable strategy(administrating and cooperative).Cases are studied by means of Matlab software.Their evolutional gaming tends to reach win-win when governments and investors decrease their costs,increase their gains and governments strictly reward or punish the investors.This paper presents suggestions on improving supervision system,optimizing rewarding/punishing mechanism and boosting technical innovation favorable for water environmental governance PPP projects,so as to increase their cooperative benefits.
作者
付晓灵
翟子瑜
FU Xiaoling;ZHAI Ziyu(School of Economics and Management,China University of Geosciences,Wuhan 430074,China)
出处
《资源与产业》
2021年第3期70-78,共9页
Resources & Industries
关键词
水环境治理
PPP模式
演化博弈
影响因素
water environmental governance
PPP mode
evolutional gaming
factors
