摘要
在习近平新时代"深化金融供给侧结构性改革"和"推进有效市场和有为政府更好结合"的政策要求背景下,以新结构经济学的最优金融结构理论为基础,结合中国的制度背景,运用2001-2015年期间的省级数据,使用固定效应和动态GMM模型实证分析了最优银行业结构偏离度对制造业全要素生产率的影响。在此基础上,将地方官员晋升激励引入新结构金融学的理论框架,研究了地方官员晋升激励对最优银行业结构偏离度和制造业全要素生产率关系的边际影响效应。实证结果发现:最优银行业结构偏离度显著地抑制了制造业全要素生产率提升;地方官员晋升激励显著地影响了最优银行业结构偏离度与制造业全要素生产率之间的关系,即随着地方官员晋升激励降低,最优银行业结构偏离度对制造业全要素生产率的边际影响越大。
Based on the optimal financial structure theory, the study of this paper is conducted in the background of the policy initiated by Xi Jinping,"deepening supply-side structural reform in the financial sector"and"advancing the integration of promising government with effective market"in the new era. By referring to China ’s institutions, adopting the provincial data from 2001 to 2015, and applying the fixed effect and dynamic GMM model, it analyzes the impact of the degree of deviation from the optimal banking structure on the total factor productivity of manufacturing. Further, it incorporates the promotion incentives for China’s local officers into the framework of new structural finance theory and studies the marginal effect of the incentives on the relation between the degree of deviation and the total factor productivity. Empirical results show that the degree of deviation from the optimal banking structure markedly prohibits the total factor productivity of manufacturing;the promotion incentives for local officers obviously affect the relation between the deviation and the productivity, that is, the lower-powered the promotion incentives are, the greater the marginal effect of the deviation on the productivity is.
作者
张凌翔
王云芳
ZHANG Ling-xiang;WANG Yun-fang(School of Management and Economics,Beijing Institute of Technology,Beijing 100081,China)
出处
《兰州大学学报（社会科学版）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2021年第3期80-97,共18页
Journal of Lanzhou University（Social Sciences）
基金
国家社会科学基金重大项目“供给侧结构性改革与发展新动力研究”(16ZDA006)。
关键词
最优银行业结构
制造业全要素生产率
地方官员晋升激励
新结构金融学
政治锦标赛
optimal banking structure
the total factor productivity of manufacturing
promotion incentives for local officers
new structural finance
political tournaments
