摘要
我国证券市场建立初期,配股曾是上市公司进行股权融资的唯一方式,但随着其他再融资方式的出现,配股则成为被边缘化的融资方式。通过选取适当的再融资样本,检验配股融资面临的决策困境,分析配股信息公告的市场效应。研究发现:配股对上市公司股东具有"强迫性",使其在决策时面临决策困境;而在配股信息公告后,中小股东表现出较为严重的"逃权"行为,对股价形成负面冲击。基于配股权定价模型和上市流通的模拟分析认为,实现配股权上市流通是破解配股现实困境、激活配股融资功能的关键所在。
In the early days of the establishment of the Chinese securities market,the rights issue was the only way to equity financing for listed companies,but with the emergence of other refinancing methods,the rights issue has become a marginalized financing method.By selecting appropriate refinancing samples,this paper tests the decision-making difficulties faced by a rights issue and analyzes the market effect of rights issue announcements.It is found that rights issue is"compulsive"to the shareholders of listed companies,making them face a decision-making dilemma in the decision-making process;and after the announcement of the rights issue,small and medium shareholders show serious"evasion"behaviors,which hurt the stock price.Finally,based on the pricing models and the simulation analysis of listing and circulation of allotment warrants,it is believed that realizing the listing and circulation of allotment warrants is the key to solving the realistic dilemma and activating the financing function of the rights issue.
作者
王桂虎
贺恩远
WANG Guihu;HE Enyuan(Institute of Finance,Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,Beijing 100028,China;School of Software and Microelectronics,Peking University,Beijing 100871,China)
出处
《经济与管理》
CSSCI
2021年第3期39-48,共10页
Economy and Management
基金
国家社科后期资助项目(18FJL010)。
关键词
配股融资
决策困境
市场效应
配股权流通
rights issue
decision dilemma
market effect
circulation of allotment warrants
