摘要
为了研究在煤矿生产企业数量有限的条件下,煤矿生产企业安全生产策略的随机演化趋势。基于随机演化博弈理论建构了博弈模型,引入频率依赖的Moran过程更新规则,依据Taylor理论和随机过程中的马尔科夫转移矩阵法计算了两策略的固定概率,以中性漂变概率为判断标准,理论分析了在强、弱选择因子条件下安全生产策略的占优条件及影响策略的因素,结果表明:提高地方监管部门对于煤矿生产企业的监管概率和对于违规生产的煤矿企业增大处罚力度可以减少违规生产行为的出现,使最终稳定状态为煤矿企业均选择安全生产策略。进一步,借助数值仿真实验进行验证并提出一些建议。
In order to study the stochastic evolutionary trend of safety production strategies of coal mining enterprises under the condition of limited number of coal production enterprises.Constructs a game model based on random evolutionary game theory,introduces frequency-dependent Moran process update rules,and calculates the fixed probabilities of the two strategies based on Taylor theory and Markov transition matrix method in random processes.The neutral drift probability is used as the judgment standards,theoretical analysis of the dominant conditions of safety production strategies and factors affecting strategies under the conditions of strong and weak selection factors,the results show that:increase the probability of local regulatory authorities for coal mine production enterprises and increase penalties for coal mine enterprises that produce illegally efforts can reduce the occurrence of illegal production behaviors,so that the final stable state is that coal mine enterprises choose safe production strategies.Further,the numerical simulation experiment is used to verify and make some suggestions.
作者
郭靖云
王天日
GUO Jing-yun;WANG Tian-ri(School of Economics and Management,Taiyuan University of Technology,Taiyuan 030024,China)
出处
《煤炭技术》
CAS
北大核心
2021年第3期166-169,共4页
Coal Technology
基金
国家自然科学基金(71701141)
山西省软科学项目(2017041007-3)。
关键词
煤矿生产企业
安全生产
固定概率
Moran过程
随机演化博弈
coal production enterprises
safe production
fixed probability
Moran process
stochastic evolutionary game
