摘要
为探究具有标签欺诈行为的生态标签产品企业和普通产品企业的竞争策略,构建双寡头竞争的同步博弈模型,并分析违规水平、监管水平、违规惩罚及消费者对生态标签的偏好等因素对企业最优策略的影响。研究表明:生态标签产品的高环境质量成本、高监管水平及高惩罚能够抑制企业违规,而消费者更看重生态标签属性的行为使企业有更大的动机选择违规生产,因此监管方提高生态标签产品的生产准入标准,曝光监管结果以减少信息不透明,并根据生态标签环境质量成本及违规惩罚选择有效的监管强度,可以有效抑制违规行为。
To study the competition strategies ofordinary product company and eco-label product company with label fraud,this study constructs a simultaneous game pricing model for duopoly competition,and analyzes the impact of factors such as the level of violation,audit level,penalty for violation and consumers’preference for eco-labels on competition strategies.The research results show that the high environmental quality cost,high regulation audit level and high penalty of label fraud can restrain companies from violating regulations,and consumers’higher preference to the eco-labels gives companies greater incentives to choose eco-label fraud.Therefore,the regulator should increase the production access standards for eco-labeled products,expose the regulatory results to reduce opaque information,and choose effective audit level based on eco-label environmental quality cost and violation penalty to suppress violations.
作者
赵连霞
王芳晴
张小峰
岳超楠
尤建新
ZHAO Lianxia;WANG Fangqing;ZHANG Xiaofeng;YUE Chaonan;YOU Jianxin(Shanghai University,Shanghai,China;Tongji University,Shanghai,China)
出处
《管理学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第12期1865-1872,共8页
Chinese Journal of Management
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71502100)
教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金资助项目(20YJAZH135)。
