摘要
沿海地方政府的海洋生态环境治理行为对我国海洋生态环境保护至关重要,由于海洋生态环境污染具有扩散性,且地方政府间存在诸多利益冲突,因此地方政府之间就海洋生态环境治理问题具有长期动态博弈关系。本文基于演化博弈理论,在充分考虑海洋生态环境改变所带来海洋经济效应的基础上,构建地方政府间海洋生态环境治理策略的演化博弈分析模型,在此基础上引入中央政府奖惩机制,建立机制约束下的演化博弈分析模型,分别对两种模型演化路径与演化稳定策略进行分析,结果显示,地方政府辖区海域生态环境相互影响水平对治理策略选择不产生干扰;奖惩强度应根据中央政府与地方政府的现实情况进行配置;提升海洋生态环境变化带来的经济效应,降低地方政府治理辖区海洋生态环境付出的成本,加强中央政府对地方政府的奖惩力度,能够有效促进地方政府对海洋生态环境问题展开联合治理,提升联合治理效率,确保海洋生态环境持续改善。
The marine ecological environment governance behavior of coastal local governments is very important to the marine ecological environment protection in China.Due to the diffusion of marine ecological environment pollution and many conflicts of interest among local governments,there is a long-term dynamic game relationship between local governments on marine ecological environment governance.Based on the evolutionary game theory and fully cons idering the marine economic effect brought by the change of marine ecological environment,this paper constructs the evolutionary game analysis model of marine ecological environment governance strategy among local governments.On this basis,the central government reward and punishment mechanism is introduced,and the evolutionary game analysis model under the constraint of the mechanism is established.The path and evolution stability strategy are analyzed.The results show that:the improvement(recession)of one government's governance(non-governance)on the marine ecological environment of the jurisdiction will not interfere with the choice of local government's governance strategy;the reward and punishment should be scientific allocated according to the actual situation of the central government and local governments;improving the economic effect brought by the changes of marine ecological environment,reducing the cost of local governments'governance of marine ecological environment,strengthening the central government's reward and punishment to local governments,can effectively promote the joint governance of local governments on marine ecological environment issues,improve the efficiency of joint governance and ensure the continuous improvement of marine ecological environment.
作者
曹洪军
蔡学森
CAO Hong-jun;CAI Xue-sen(Management College of Ocean University of China,Shandong Qingdao 266100,China)
出处
《中国渔业经济》
2021年第1期22-30,共9页
Chinese Fisheries Economics
关键词
海洋生态环境治理
地方政府
奖惩机制
海洋经济效应
marine ecological environment governance
local governments
reward and punishment mechanism
the marine economic effect
