摘要
通过分析我国跨界水资源冲突的特点,建立了跨界水资源冲突事件中地方保护主义行为的演化博弈数理模型,研究了地方政府部门在冲突的不同阶段与己方冲突群体、对方地方政府部门和中央政府博弈的策略选择。理论研究表明:(1)地方政府不会在跨界水资源冲突事件中有效发挥强互惠者的角色功能,在处理己方冲突群体的行动中,地方政府会选择"纵容"策略,导致跨界水资源冲突事态扩大化;(2)由于地方保护主义思想的存在,依靠地方政府之间的协商无法解决跨界水资源冲突,导致跨界水资源冲突事态久拖不决,必须中央政府的强制介入;(3)无论地方政府采取什么策略,中央政府的占优策略均为强制干预,此时,地方政府采取不合作策略的得益总是小于合作策略,则中央政府与地方政府博弈的演化稳定策略为(强制干预,合作),从而跨界水资源冲突得以解决。最后结合数值仿真分析,得到如下研究结论:依靠地方政府无法解决跨界水资源冲突,强互惠中央政府的管制是破解这一难题的必由之路。
Trans-boundary water conflict is becoming a global issue because of water shortage crisis caused by global warming and human overpopulation.Water resource management issues have not only caused economic losses and human casualties,but also created social stability and wars in many regions.The current research in this area primarily examines trans-boundary conflict from the perspective of rational allocation of water resources,and emphasizes on water user agents.However,trans-boundary water resources conflict is a complex problem consisting of interactions among natural systems,water user agents and management agents.As the core of conflict,humans play an important role in trans-boundary water conflict.Using a river basin trans-boundary water conflict event as the real case,this paper studies the local protectionism behavior of local government during the incident resolution process.By establishing evolutionary game models,this paper investigates how a local government chooses different strategies to deal with its own conflict group,the opposing local government,and the Central Government at different stages of the conflict.First,the paper analyzes complex game relationships in a trans-boundary water conflict.Chinese government has implemented a water resources management system by combining watershed management with administrative management.The system enables local government to play an important role in the management of a trans-boundary water conflict.Local governments have to coordinate with their own water user agents opposing local governments,while being managed by the Central Government.The strategic choice of local government in a water conflict has influence on the evolutionary direction of the conflict.The paper proposes that a local government should use different game models to resolve a trans-boundary water conflict.These game models are established in phases due to different principal contradictions in different conflict stages.The first stage is the beginning of conflict.The principal contradictio
出处
《管理工程学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第2期64-72,共9页
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
基金
国家社会科学基金资助项目(10CGL051)
国家自然科学基金资助项目(50979024
90924027)
中央高校基本科研业务费资助项目(2009B22314)
关键词
跨界水资源冲突
地方政府
地方保护主义行为
强互惠中央政府
演化博弈
trans-boundary water conflict
local government
local protectionism behavior
strong reciprocity central government
evolutionary game
