摘要
资本市场异动是金融市场最普遍的“灰犀牛”隐患之一,分析师和互动平台的单边外部力量在风险治理方面被证明存在明显弊端。本文以2010—2017年沪深A股上市公司为研究样本,探究了直接信息渠道互动平台和间接信息媒介分析师对企业股价暴跌风险以及信息错报风险的交互作用。结果表明:直接信息强度和间接信息强度的交互作用既能抑制事前信息错报风险,也能降低事后股价暴跌风险。分析师层面的异质性表明,上述效应仅存在于明星分析师关注度以及关联分析师较高组;互动平台层面的异质性表明,上述效应仅存在于管理层问题回复质量较高组。
Capital market volatility is one of the most common“gray rhino”hidden dangers in financial markets,and the unilateral external governance is proved to have obvious disadvantages.Taking A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2010 to 2017 as research samples,this paper explores the interaction between the interactive platform of direct information channels and indirect information media analysts on the dual risk of stock price collapse and information misreporting.The results show that the interaction of direct information intensity and indirect information intensity not only inhibits the risk of misreporting of information in advance but also reduces the risk of stock price collapse afterwards.The heterogeneity at the analyst level showed that the above effect only existed in the group with higher star analyst reports and correlation analyst reports.The heterogeneity at the level of interactive platform indicates that the above effect only exists in the group with higher quality of management problem response.
作者
刘柏
琚涛
蒋成功
LIU Bai;JU Tao;JIANG Chenggong(Business School,Jilin University,Changchun 130012,China;School of Economics and Management,Shanghai Maritime University,Shanghai 201306,China)
出处
《西安交通大学学报（社会科学版）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2021年第2期19-32,共14页
Journal of Xi'an Jiaotong University：Social Sciences
基金
国家社会科学基金项目(18BJY232)。
关键词
资本市场
风险治理
股价暴跌
信息错报
信息强度
信息质量
分析师特征
capital market
risk government
stock price collapse
information misreporting
information intensity
information quality
analyst characteristics
