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基于演化博弈的电力企业综合能源服务转型行为选择方法研究 被引量:3

Research on Selection Method of Transformation Behavior towards Integrated Energy Service for Electric Power Enterprises Based on Evolutionary Game
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摘要 针对当前电力企业综合能源服务转型行为选择问题,以政府与电力企业为演化群体建立转型行为选择演化博弈模型,对其动态演化进行了深入分析。通过模型的求解与分析,确定各种转型行为对应的稳定点,为政府和电力企业根据当前转型条件确定是否适宜转型提供指导。同时,政府和电力企业可根据鞍点位置改变相关参数以促进转型。 As to the selection problem of transformation behavior towards integrated energy service in electric power enterprises,by employing the evolutionary game theory,a behavior selection model is developed taking the government and the electric power enterprise as the evolutionary groups.By executing the model,the stable points corresponding to various transformation behaviors are determined,which provides a guidance for the government and the electric power enterprises to determine whether they are suitable for transformation according to the current transformation conditions.In addition,according to the saddle point position,the government and the electric power enterprises can change the relevant parameters to promote the transformation.
作者 侯亚群 任洪波 李琦芬 吴琼 杨涌文 HOU Ya-qun;REN Hong-bo;LI Qi-fen;WU Qiong;YANG Yong-wen(College of Energy and Mechanical Engineering,Shanghai University of Electric Power,Shanghai 200090,China)
出处 《应用能源技术》 2020年第11期1-6,共6页 Applied Energy Technology
基金 国家自然科学基金项目(71804106) 上海市科委重点研究项目(19DZ1206800,19DZ1205700)。
关键词 演化博弈 综合能源 政府 电力企业 行为选择 evolutionary game integrated energy service government electric power enterprise behavior selection
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