摘要
海德格尔将马克思哲学判定为形而上学,源于他以“存在”的视域来解释和评论马克思笔下“人的规定”的意蕴。他将马克思以社会实践规定人的思路指认为某种形而上学,遮蔽了实践本身所涵盖的主客体统一的特质,反而强化了对存在的敞开和持守;他肯认生产劳动由于陷入“诸种强制”而必然走向“自我毁灭”,却未能洞悉劳动是自然性与社会性的统一以及“生产—消费”是人类解放的手段而非目的的真谛;他指认共产主义本质上是技术主义并终将呈现为虚无主义的状态,源于他对虚无主义的界定诉诸技术追问而非现实批判以及将克服虚无主义置于“存在之思”而非革命实践中。在对海德格尔评论的辨与思中,马克思关于“人的规定”的科学内涵与最终指向得以进一步显现。
Heidegger’s judgment of Marx’s philosophy as metaphysics stems from his interpretation and comment on the meaning of“human regulations”in Marx’s writings from the perspective of“existence”.He refers to Marx’s idea of dictating people by social practice as a certain metaphysics,which obscures the unity of subject and object covered by the practice itself,but strengthens the openness and persistence of existence;he agrees that productive labor has fallen into“various kinds”of“Compulsion”will inevitably lead to self-destruction,but he fails to understand that labor is the unity of naturalness and sociality and“production-consumption”is a means of human liberation rather than the objective.He points out that communism was essentially a state of technicism and would eventually present as nihilism,because his definition of nihilism appealed to technical inquiry rather than realistic criticism,and the overcoming of nihilism was placed in the“thinking of existence”rather than revolutionary practice.In the discussion of Heidegger’s comments,the scientific connotation and ultimate direction of Marx’s“human stipulation”are further revealed in the comparative analysis.
作者
张发平
刘同舫
ZHANG Fa-ping;LIU Tong-fang(Zhejiang Ocean University;Zhejiang University)
出处
《华中科技大学学报（社会科学版）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第6期67-73,共7页
Journal of Huazhong University of Science and Technology(Social Science Edition)
关键词
马克思
海德格尔
人的规定
误判
Marx
Heidegger
human regulations
miscalculation
