摘要
【目的】探索使药品需求方利益分配更加公平和合理的机制。【方法】首先分析了在对基本药物限价、其他药物市场化定价的政策下,药品纳什均衡价格的演化趋势。然后采用实验案例,以超网络结构的合作博弈理论为基础,分别使用Shapley值、Myerson值和Position值3个重要的分配规则,计算了需求方各方所能分配到的"讨价还价"利益。最后,采用演化博弈的方法,分析了公立医院在政府不同补偿条件下"寻租"的可能。【结果】在基本药品价格受限的情况下,其他药品的市场价格会走低且不高于它在不受政府最高零售价格或指导价格限定情况下的纳什均衡价格;需求方剩余会增加且不小于在不受政府最高零售价格或指导价格限定情况下的纳什均衡需方剩余。在实验案例中,使用Position值进行分配最有利于保障人民群众的利益。【结论】在药品流通领域改革过程中,政府必须根据需求方超网络联盟的结构特征,以及"使人民群众利益最大化"的实际需要,选择合适的分配方法,将需求方联盟与供应方"讨价还价"获得的降价利益以合理的方式让渡给人民群众。同时,要通过提高违规成本、完善"预警"机制等措施,防止公立医院"寻租"现象的产生。
[Purposes]It explores mechanisms to make the distribution of drug demand-side benefits more equitable and reasonable.[Methods]Firstly,the evolution trend of drug Nash equilibrium price under the policy of price limit for essential drugs and market pricing for other drugs is analyzed.Then based on the cooperative game theory of the hypergraph structure,three important distribution rules,the Shapley,Myerson and Position value,are used to calculate the"bargaining"benefits that the coalitions on the demand side can be allocated.Finally,using the evolutionary game method,the possibility of"rent-seeking"in public hospitals under different government compensation conditions is analyzed.[Findings]Research shows that when the price of essential drugs is limited,the market price of other drugs will be lower and no higher than its Nash equilibrium price without the government’s maximum retail price or guidance price;the demand side surplus will increase and not be less than the Nash equilibrium demand side surplus without the government’s maximum retail price or the guiding price limit.In the experimental case,the use of Position value for distribution is most conducive to the protection of the interests of the people.[Conclusions]In the process of reform in the field of drug circulation,the government must choose an appropriate distribution method according to the structural characteristics of the demand-side alliance and the actual needs of"maximizing the interests of the people"and transfer the"bargaining"profit from the price reduction in a reasonable way to the people.At the same time,it is necessary to prevent the phenomenon of rent-seeking in public hospitals by raising the cost of violation and perfecting the mechanism of early warning.
作者
蔡蕾
曾晗
彭超靖
CAI Lei;ZENG Han;PENG Chaojin(School of Management,Shanghai University,Shanghai 200444;Shanghai General Hospital,Shanghai 200080,China)
出处
《重庆师范大学学报（自然科学版）》
CAS
北大核心
2020年第4期6-14,共9页
Journal of Chongqing Normal University:Natural Science
基金
国家自然科学基金(No.11571222)。
关键词
博弈论
药品需求方
利益分配
机制
game theory
drug demand side
distribution of benefits
mechanism
