摘要
本文研究我国制度背景下上市公司选择员工持股计划的动机。本文发现,我国上市公司所实施的员工持股计划长期激励导向较弱,但员工持股计划的推出能带来公司股价的短期提升。公司在发生股价崩盘后更倾向于推出员工持股计划,且当大股东股权被质押时和大股东减持前,股价崩盘对公司推出员工持股计划倾向的影响更明显。本文的结果表明,我国上市公司可能出于市值管理的动机选择员工持股计划,这对于理解我国制度背景下的员工持股计划有所裨益,也丰富了员工持股计划动机研究的文献,为监管层和企业对员工持股计划的进一步探讨提供参考。
In this paper,we study Chinese listed firms’motives for adopting employee stock ownership plans(ESOPs).This paper finds that the incentive effect of Chinese ESOPs is relatively weak,but the adoption of ESOPs can increase firms’stock price shortly.Firms elaborately choose the timing of ESOPs,and are inclined to adopt ESOPs after experiencing the stock price crash,especially when controlling shareholders’stocks are pledged and before controlling shareholders’stock-selling periods.The results show that Chinese listed firms may choose ESOPs for market value management purpose.Our paper contributes to the research of motivation for adopting ESOPs,is beneficial to understanding ESOPs based on the Chinese institutional background,and may provide the regulators and firms with more information for further discussion related to ESOPs.
出处
《会计研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第5期91-103,共13页
Accounting Research
基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目“信息技术环境下投资者信息能力对市场效率影响研究”(71672039)的资助。
关键词
员工持股计划
股价崩盘
大股东股权质押
大股东减持
市值管理
Employee Stock Ownership Plans
Stock Price Crash
Controlling Shareholders’Stock Pledge
Controlling Shareholders’Stock-selling
Market Value Management
