摘要
公共危机治理对政府日常管理模式提出了重塑要求,对政府治理能力也不断提出新的挑战,同时也衍生出不良的地方官员避责行为。日常管理现实困境、危机治理多重挑战等外部环境,滋生出地方官员的避责动机与避责行为,并且在内外互动中,危机治理的叠加风险加剧了避责行为的蔓延。风险感知聚集、目标判断自利、行为选择躲罚、处置过程逃避和衍生结果纵容,构成官员避责行为的内在逻辑。围绕优化权责配置体系、完善监督问责制度、推进激励机制建设、增强危机意识和治理能力的维度,可为化解公共危机情态下官员避责现象提供对策思考。
Public crisis governance reshapes the government’s daily administration mode,keeps posing new challenges to the government’s governance capacity,and also gives rise to the bad behavior of local officials’avoidance of responsibility.The external factors,such as the realistic predicament of daily administration and multiple challenges of crisis governance,comprehensively give rise to the motivation of local officials’avoid⁃ance of responsibility and the behavior of local officials’avoidance of responsibility.Moreover,in the internal and external interaction,the overlapping risks of crisis governance aggravate the spread of the avoidance of re⁃sponsibility.The aggregation of risk perception,the self-benefit of target judgment,the avoidance of the punish⁃ment of behavior choice,the avoidance of disposal process,and the connivance of derivative results,constitute the internal logic of officials’avoidance of responsibility.Focusing on optimizing the power and responsibility allocation system,perfecting the supervision and accountability system,promoting the construction of incentive system,and enhancing the crisis awareness and governance capacity,this article provides solutions to local offi⁃cials’avoidance of responsibility in the condition of public crisis.
作者
盛明科
陈廷栋
SHENG Ming-ke;CHEN Ting-dong
出处
《北京行政学院学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第5期21-29,共9页
Journal of Beijing administration institute
基金
国家社会科学基金项目(18VSJ101)。
关键词
公共危机
危机治理
地方官员
避责行为
治理能力
public crisis
crisis governance
local officials
avoidance of responsibility
governance capacity
