摘要
以CEO任期周期的“季节效应”理论为基础,本文利用2008—2015年A股上市公司数据,实证分析了CEO任职周期对公司股价崩盘风险产生的影响、作用机制以及内部控制对该影响的调节效应。研究发现:CEO任期与股价崩盘风险之间呈现显著的U型关系,在任职初期股价崩盘风险较高但会逐步降低,而在任期接近结束时股价崩盘风险则会再度升高,在某一任职阶段股价崩盘风险会降至最低。同时,该U型关系在较差的CEO职业经验、较低的CEO业界声誉、CEO内部升任等情况下表现得更强;会计稳健性和非效率投资在该U型关系中发挥了显著的中介作用,盈余管理则并未发挥中介作用;高效率内部控制机制在有效降低公司股价崩盘风险的同时显著弱化了该U型关系。这表明,CEO在任期不同阶段对职业生涯和声誉的考虑会影响到会计信息披露和投资行为,进而导致股价崩盘风险的周期性变化,而完善的内部控制机制则能弱化这种周期性变化。本文丰富了股价崩盘风险影响因素的研究成果,有助于客观评价内部控制在降低股价波动风险中的作用,亦为监管者稳定证券市场秩序提供了新思路。
Based on the CEO tenure's“seasonal effect”theory,this paper analyzes the impact of CEO tenure on stock price crash risk,its mechanism and moderating effect of internal control by using the data of A-share listed companies from 2008 to 2015.The results of the study indicates:there is a significant U-shape relationship between CEO tenure and stock price crash risk.At the beginning of CEO tenure,stock price crash risk is higher but will gradually decrease.At the end of CEO tenure,it will increase again.At a certain stage of CEO tenure,it will be minimized.And the U-shape relationship will be stronger in the case of poorer CEO career experience,lower CEO industry reputation and CEO internal promotion;accounting conservatism and inefficient investment play significant mediating role in the U-shape relationship between CEO tenure and stock price crash risk,while earnings management does not play a mediating role;efficient internal control mechanism not only reduces the stock price crash risk,but also significantly weakens the U-shape relationship between CEO tenure and stock price crash risk.The results show that the consideration of career and reputation of CEO at different tenure stage will affect the company's accounting information disclosure and investment behavior,which will lead to the cyclical change of stock price crash risk,and the perfect internal control mechanism can weaken the cyclical change.This paper enriches the research results of the factors that influence stock price crash risk.It also helps to objectively evaluate the role of internal control in reducing the risk of stock price fluctuations,and provides new ideas for regulators to stabilize the order of stock market.
作者
郝东洋
史莹莹
张天西
HAO Dong-yang;SHI Ying-ying;ZHANG Tian-xi
出处
《中央财经大学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第8期45-60,共16页
Journal of Central University of Finance & Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目“信息披露非理性失衡、内部风险控制与公司股价崩盘”(项目编号:71472064)
国家自然科学基金面上项目“XBRL信息环境下会计账簿数据与财务报告数据的整合与实现研究”(项目编号:71372104)。
关键词
CEO
任职周期“季节效应”
股价崩盘风险
会计稳健性
非效率投资
内部控制
CEO tenure's“seasonal effect”Stock price crash risk
Accounting conservatism
Inefficient investment
Internal control mechanism
