摘要
基于2007年至2018年我国沪深A股上市公司的相关数据,将高管经营能力与在职权力置于同一研究框架内进行分析,对比了二者对公司股价崩盘风险的作用方向和强度。研究发现:管理者经营能力的提高可以显著降低公司股价暴跌的概率,而管理者权力过大会使公司的股价崩盘风险增加;企业风险承担水平在高管经营能力和在职权力影响股价崩盘风险的过程中起到明显的中介作用,风险承担的具体形式主要有研发支出、资本支出和债务融资三个方面;内部控制水平在高管在职权力发挥影响作用的过程中具有显著的调节效应。
This paper used the related data of Chinese A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2007 to 2018,and used the same framework to analyze top management’s managerial ability and managerial power, then explored and compared the action direction and density of the effect of the two on stock price crash risk. The findings proved that, along with enhanced managerial ability, the corresponding probability of stock price crash risk presented an obvious downward trend, while larger powers of top management had increased the risk of stock price crash. Furthermore, corporate risk-taking level had played a mediating role in these relations from three aspects of R&D expenditure, capital expenditure and debt financing. Besides, internal control level had only regulated the effect of managerial power.
作者
郑雅心
ZHENG Ya-xin(School of Finance,University of International Business and Economics,Beijing100029,China)
出处
《山西财经大学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2021年第7期112-126,共15页
Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics
关键词
公司高管
经营能力
在职权力
股价崩盘风险
企业风险承担
top management
managerial ability
managerial power
stock price crash risk
risk-taking level
