摘要
在制造商进行生产减排的低碳供应链中,零售商之间存在促销竞争以及促销成本系数为零售商私有信息的情况。分别构建了考虑零售商竞争的低碳供应链集中决策模型和信息不对称决策模型,对制造商减排率以及零售商促销水平进行求解,并通过引入由批发价和成本共担组成的联合契约对供应链进行协调。研究发现:联合契约的引入可以激励零售商在保证自身利益的前提下选择与制造商共享私有信息,不对称信息造成的利润损失得以挽回;随着零售商之间竞争程度的增加,集中决策和信息不对称情形下的供应链利润差减小,用以揭示私有信息的联合契约越有效;制造商减排成本系数的提高降低了供应链成员的利润;零售商促销成本系数越高,制造商在揭示私有信息过程中付出的信息租金越少,对制造商越有利。
In the context of manufacturers carrying on carbon emission reduction in the process of production,the competition between retailers and promotional effort cost coefficient as the retailers’ private information was discussed. By introducing the joint contract combination of whole sale price and cost-sharing,the coordination model of low-carbon supply chain considering retailers’ competition and information asymmetric was constructed respectively,which prompted retailers to transmit the real promotion cost information and made the decision of promotional effort. The results show that the introduction of joint contract makes the profit of supply chain under asymmetric information run up to the level of centralized decision-making level almost;the higher the competition degree,the more effectively thejoint contract;the profit of manufacturers and retailers is on a declining curve with the increasing of coefficient;with the increasing promotional cost coefficient, the manufacture’s information rents reduce while the profit of manufacture shows upward tendency.
作者
王伟冬
李小燕
WANG Weidong;LI Xiaoyan(Tianjin College,Beijing University of Science and Technology,Tianjin 301830,China;School of Information,Beijing WuZi University,Beijing 101149,China)
出处
《工业工程与管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第3期27-33,共7页
Industrial Engineering and Management
关键词
竞争
促销
信息不对称
低碳供应链
协调
competition
promotion effort
information asymmetry
low-carbon supply chain
coordination
