摘要
为增进人力资本的积累,我国高等学校从1999年开始实施大规模的扩招。针对高等教育普及化对劳动者人力资本投入的影响,以及此种影响如何随人力资本积累正外部性的强弱而变化的研究表明,用人单位的不同工资制度带来"预期效应",使得劳动者在高等教育普及之后,能够最优地选择受教育期间的人力资本积累水平。当劳动者面对未来用人单位"多劳多得"的工资制度时,更有激励利用高等教育扩张的机会来提高自身的人力资本,教育的正外部性得以内化。而当劳动者面对未来用人单位"平均化"的工资制度时,其增加的人力资本对社会总生产力有贡献,但收益却被群体均分。此时,人力资本积累的正外部性过强,能力较高的劳动者通过受教育来进一步提高自身能力的激励反而减弱。因此,应该从政策层面降低高等教育的正外部性造成的效率损失,最大限度地调动劳动者积极性。
In order to enhance the accumulation of human capital,China’universities began to implement a large-scale enrollment expansion since 1999.This paper explores the impact of universalization of higher education on workers’human capital input and how this impact changes with the positive externalities of human capital accumulation.It is found that different wage systems of employers bring"expected effect",which enables workers to choose the best levels of human capital accumulation during the period of education after the universalization of higher education.When a worker anticipates a salary schedule that directly links with his future productivity,he is fully incentivized to take advantage of the opportunities created by the higher education expansion and to internalize the positive externalities of education.On the other side,when a worker anticipates an"average-productivity"wage scheme from their potential employers,the increased human capital contributes to the total productivity of the society,but the benefits are shared equally.The positive externality of human capital accumulation discourages high-ability workers from exerting more effort in school.Therefore,policies should be adopted to reduce the efficiency loss caused by the positive externality of higher education and mobilize the enthusiasm of workers to the greatest extent.
作者
王云
郝泽栋
WANG Yun;HAO Zedong(Wang Yanan Institute for Studies in Economics,Xiamen University,Xiamen,Fujian 361005;School of Philosophy,Wuhan University,Wuhan,Hubei 430072)
出处
《中国人民大学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第3期93-107,共15页
Journal of Renmin University of China
关键词
高等教育普及化
教育信号模型
激励机制
工资溢价
Universalization of higher education
Education signal model
Incentive mechanism
Wage premium
