摘要
本文以2011~2016年中国家族上市公司为样本,综合代理理论与组织理论研究了董事长-总经理亲缘关系对家族企业创新投入的影响,并探讨了股权家族化与制度环境的调节效应,研究结果发现:①董事长与总经理之间的亲缘关系越近,家族企业的创新投入越少;②随着股权家族化水平的提升,董事长-总经理亲缘关系对家族企业创新投入的负向影响会增强;③随着外部制度环境的改善,董事长-总经理亲缘关系对家族企业创新投入的负向影响会减弱。本文进一步探究了董事长-总经理亲缘关系对家族企业创新投入的影响机制,研究结果表明董事长-总经理亲缘关系通过代理成本和组织冗余两条途径来影响家族企业的创新投入。在家族企业普遍任用家族成员担任董事长与总经理的现实背景下,本文发现董事长与总经理之间亲缘关系的远近是影响家族企业创新投入的关键因素之一。本文的研究结论能够从亲缘关系的视角来解释家族企业创新投入不足的原因,对于家族企业如何配置董事长与总经理具有一定的启示意义。
Innovation is of great significance to the long-term development of family firms. However,family firms generally suffer from the problem of insufficient innovation investment. This paper explores the relationship between Chairman-CEO kinship and innovation input of family firms in China,based on the agency theory and the organizational theory. In particular we explore the moderating role of family ownership and institutional environment in this relationship. First,we argue that the closer the kinship between the chairman and the CEO,the greater the agency costs in family firms,which may lead to the reduction of innovation investment;Meanwhile,the closer the kinship between the chairman and the CEO,the less organizational slack used in the economic goals and the firm system,which fail to support innovation. Second,the increased level of family ownership may exaggerate the agency costs,which may ledd to the reduction of innovation input. At the same time,the manager tend to keep the organizational slack in the family system rather than in the firm system in order to meet the needs of more family members,which further reduce the organizational slack in the firm system and the economic goals. Finally,better institutional environment could inhibit the opportunistic behavior of family managers and reduce the negative impact of agency problems on innovation investmentslackslack. Based on the data from 2011 to 2016 of 353 listed family firms and 2,110 firm-year observations,we find that:(1) the Chairman-CEO kinship was negatively related with innovation input;(2) family ownership strengthened the negative relationship between the Chairman-CEO kinship and innovation input;(3) with the improvement of the external institutional environment,the negative relationship between the Chairman-CEO kinship and innovation input of family firms was weakened;(4) agency cost and organizational slack were the two ways to influence the relationship between the Chairman-CEO kinship and innovation input. This paper shows that while family m
作者
杜善重
Shanzhong Du(China Academy of Corporate Governance,Nankai University;Business School,Nankai Univeisity)
出处
《管理学季刊》
2019年第4期86-111,156,共27页
Quarterly Journal of Management
基金
国家自然科学基金项目“董事会非正式沟通对决策质量的影响研究:路径、机理与效应”(71372093)
国家自然科学基金项目“股东网络特征与投资决策权配置研究”(71772094)
教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目“多元利益主体参与的公司治理决策机制研究”(18JJD630002)资助。
