摘要
内部人寻租一直以来是理论与实务界关心的重点,如何有效抑制内部人寻租行为是资本市场的重大课题。本文以内部人交易度量内部人寻租,分析了融券制度对内部人寻租的影响。研究发现:(1)融券制度对内部人寻租有显著抑制作用,并且融券规模越大,内部人寻租越少。(2)相比于国有企业,非国有企业当中融券制度对内部人寻租的抑制作用更加明显。本文还将内部人交易分方向进行回归,结果显示融券制度对内部人寻租的抑制作用主要体现在卖出方向上。本文进一步分析了融券制度影响内部人寻租的路径,发现“竞争效应”和“信息效应”是融券制度影响内部人寻租的两条重要路径。本文考虑了竞争性解释——分析师关注的作用,发现分析师关注并不能影响本文结论的正确性;本文还利用反面事实推断、倾向得分匹配、反向因果检验等方法,确保实证结论的稳健性。本文的研究结果,丰富了内部人寻租的特征及影响因素研究,有利于市场监管部门加强对内部人寻租行为的控制;扩充了有关融券制度的文献,为卖空制度的推行及完善提供理论依据。
Short selling refers to investors who sell stocks they do not hold in their hands and expect to repay the borrowed stocks by buying later at a lower price.Starting from March 31,2010,the Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange issued announcements to announce the qualification list for short selling.The introduction of short selling means the short selling can be used in China s capital market.The short selling system is a double-edged sword.On the one hand,short selling transactions provide the insider who have access to information with opportunities for low-cost arbitrage,may trigger severe market volatility,which in turn dampens market confidence and damages market liquidity;on the other hand,short selling helps the stock price to reflect the company s negative information timely,reduce the stock s overvaluation,improve the efficiency of market pricing,and improve the efficiency of market resource allocation.Insider trade refers to the behavior of“Insider”(executives,directors,and supervisors,etc.)trading their own company shares,which is an important manifestation of rent-seeking behavior of insiders.Existing research shows that insiders will use information advantages to conduct insider transactions and obtain excess returns.Since short selling helps negative information to enter stock prices timely and improve market pricing efficiency,does the short selling system inhibit executives use of information to seek rent,such as insider trading?There is no answer in the existing literature.Under the principal-agent framework,insiders such as company executives can not only violate the legitimate interests of investors by building corporate empires or connected transactions,insiders can also use their own information advantages to extract rents——trading their own company stocks to obtain excess returns.The former is concealed,and the latter is conspicuous.How can this more conspicuous insider trading behavior be governed?The short selling system is an important mechanism in the capital market.
作者
张洪辉
平帆
章琳一
ZHANG Hong-hui;PING Fan;ZHANG Lin-yi(School of Accounting,Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics,Nanchang,Jiangxi,330013,China;Business School of Renmin University,Beijing,100872,China)
出处
《经济管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第3期166-191,共26页
Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )
基金
国家自然科学基金项目“控股股东缺失与公司治理:溯源、影响与治理”(71962010)
教育部人文社会科学项目“高质量审计、晋升锦标赛与机会主义行为”(18YJC790227)
教育部人文社会科学项目“内部控制优势富集效应,晋升锦标赛与企业社会责任”(19YJC790182)
关键词
融券制度
内部人寻租
信息效应
竞争效应
产权性质
short selling
insider trading
information effect
competition effect
property nature
