摘要
[目的\意义]网贷平台的发展在一定程度上解决了小微企业融资难的困境,但是互联网的金融脱媒特性,在一定程度上加大了网贷借款人的信用违约风险,分析P2P市场借贷双方行为策略的影响机制,有助于更好的促进网贷行业的规范发展。[方法\过程]为了更好的描述网贷中借贷双方的行为决策动态演化过程,将声誉惩罚引入借贷双方的演化博弈模型,分析演化结果的稳定条件,利用Python软件仿真分析不同参数对演化结果的影响。[结果 \结论]在引入动态惩罚措施之前,博弈双方的系统演化过程呈现出闭轨线环的周期运动,在引入声誉损失动态惩罚后,系统演化轨迹螺旋收敛于均衡焦点。
[Purpose\Significance]The development of online loan platform solves the dilemma of financing difficulties for micro and small companies to a certain extent,but the characteristics of Internet financial disintermediation have increased the credit default risk of online lenders to some extent. The analysis about the impact mechanism of the behavioral strategies of both parties can help to promote the standardized development of the online loan industry. [Methods \ Process] In order to better describe the dynamic evolution process of behavioral decision-making between lenders and borrowers in online lending,the reputation penalty is introduced into the evolutionary game model of both lenders borrowers,and the stable conditions of the evolutionary results are analyzed. The Python software is used to simulate and analyze the impact of different parameters on results.[Results \ Conclusion] Before the introduction of dynamic punitive measures,the system evolution process of both sides of the game presents a cyclical motion of closed-loop. After introducing the dynamic penalty of reputation loss,the system evolution trajectory spirals to the equilibrium focus.
作者
王薇
汪明艳
WANG Wei;WANG Ming-yan(School of Management,Shanghai University of Engineering Science,Shanghai 201620,China)
出处
《物流工程与管理》
2020年第1期146-150,143,共6页
Logistics Engineering and Management
关键词
小微企业
P2P借贷
演化博弈
声誉惩罚
micro and small companies
P2P lending
evolutionary game
reputation punishment
