摘要
针对碳排放数据第三方核查模式,构建了政府、控排企业和第三方核查机构的三方演化博弈模型,结合系统动力学理论进行仿真模拟,根据结果进行优化。研究表明:碳排放数据第三方核查系统的均衡解不能达到演化稳定均衡,一般惩罚策略只能较短时间内产生效果,但经过重复博弈之后将呈上下震荡,且幅度逐渐加大,政府监管更加困难;动态惩罚的引入对波动起到抑制作用,形成稳定的演化均衡,但是控排企业仍存在一定违规概率;优化动态奖惩机制不仅抑制了波动,还降低了政府监管概率和控排企业违规概率,能达到最优演化稳定策略,在政府不监管的情况下,控排企业和第三方机构将选择守法经营。研究为碳排放数据第三方核查工作的有效实施提供一定参考。
For the third-party verification mode of carbon emission data, the paper constructs a three-party evolutionary game model including government, emission reduction enterprises and third-party verification agencies. On the basis of system dynamic theory, the model is to be simulated and optimized according to the results. The conclusions are as follows: the equilibrium solution of the third-party verification system of carbon emission data can not reach the equilibrium of evolution and stability. The general punishment strategy can only be effective in a short period of time, but if repeated games are executed, there will be fluctuations, and the scope will gradually increase, which makes government supervision more difficult;The introduction of dynamic punishment can inhibit fluctuations and form a stable evolutionary equilibrium, but there are still certain violations. Optimizing the dynamic reward and punishment mechanism not only damps volatility, but also reduces the probability of government supervision and the probability of violating the rules of emission reduction enterprises. In the case of non-regulatory supervision, emission reduction enterprises and third-party organizations choose to operate according to law. The results of the paper can provide a reference for the effective implementation of third-party verification of carbon emission data.
作者
马歆
霍猛
MA Xin;HUO Meng(School of Management and Economics,North China University of Water Resources and Electric Power,Zhengzhou Henan 450046,China)
出处
《生态经济》
北大核心
2020年第1期26-33,共8页
Ecological Economy
基金
国家社会科学基金项目“时空分异视角下碳交易对我国区域经济发展的影响研究”(16BJL076)
关键词
碳排放数据
系统动力学
演化博弈
carbon emission data
system dynamics
evolution game
