摘要
近年来,地方政府债务规模扩张积聚的风险引起了政府监管者的关注,其产生的经济后果也成为了新的研究课题。文章基于全国266个地市数据,实证检验了2008-2017年地方政府债务规模对当地上市公司负债水平和债务成本的影响。研究发现:首先,地方政府债务规模通过减少上市公司的短期负债和经营性负债来降低其负债水平。地方政府债务规模对非国有、基础设施和公益行业和亏损上市公司负债水平的挤出效应更大。其次,地方政府债务规模推高了上市公司债务成本。上述结果说明,地方政府债务规模扩张通过需求竞争机制降低了企业负债水平,通过价格机制推高了企业债务成本。文章的研究结果为地方政府财政政策的微观效应提供了证据,有助于监管层理解企业"融资难、融资贵"的原因,对控制地方政府债务水平,进一步提高企业融资能力,为经济发展注入新活力等也有一定的参考价值。
Since 2008, the Global Financial Crisis has had a huge impact on China’s export-oriented economy. The State Council in 2008 launched an economic stimulus plan known as "Four-Trillion Investment"(70.50% of the total package, i.e. 2.82 trillion RMB, was financed by local governments). Since then,the scale of local government debt has increased significantly, which has produced some unexpected economic consequences for the allocation of credit resources and even economic development.The revenue and cost of government borrowing are the core concerns of many countries. The impact of government borrowing on the investment and financing of firms has been studied in the existing literature. Due to the great differences in the development of legal system and financial market, the micro consequences of government borrowing are also inconsistent, i.e. there is a dispute between the "crowding-out effect" and the"crowding-in effect" in the economic theory. Therefore, does local government debt affect the debt of local firms? If so, how does the affection occur? These are real problems worth studying.Based on the data of 266 cities in China, this paper tests the impact of the local government debt scale on local firms’ debt level and debt cost in 2008-2017. The results show that: First, the scale of local government debt decreases firm leverage. Specifically, the scale of local government debt decreases firm leverage by reducing the short-term debt and operating debt scale. Compared with state-owned, non-infrastructure and public welfare industries, and profitable companies, the scale of local government debt has a stronger negative effect on the firm leverage of non-state-owned, infrastructure and public welfare industries, and loss-making companies. Second, the scale of local government debt increases the debt cost of non-state-owned companies. The results show that the expansion of the local government debt scale has a crowding-out effect on firm leverage through the demand competition mechanism, and increases firms’
作者
汪金祥
吴世农
吴育辉
Wang Jinxiang;Wu Shinong;Wu Yuhui(College of Management,Fujian Agriculture and Forestry University,Fuzhou 350002,China;School of Management,Xiamen University,Xiamen 361005,China)
出处
《财经研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第1期111-125,共15页
Journal of Finance and Economics
基金
国家社会科学基金青年项目(17CGL015)
国家自然科学基金重大项目(71790601)
关键词
地方债
负债水平
债务成本
挤出效应
local government debt
firm leverage
debt cost
crowding-out effect
